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ABSTRACT

The purpose of this study is to examine whether certain modern
revolutions lend themselves to a causal theory of revolution.

To achieve this a causal theory of revolution was devised,
leaning strongly on existing works.

A fresh theory was approached,

not to break new ground or to disprove others, but to show the
similarities between seemingly opposed theorists.;

Three modern revolutions were then chosen to test this theory
Cuba 1959, and Iran and Nicaragua 1979.

It soon became clear that while factors of my theory existed
in all three revolutions their importance varied.

With this

weighting firmly in mind the theory proved useful for the study
of contemporary revolution.

The study concluded by examining the role of the Political Scientist
in predicting revolution.

The author calls for more study of

modern revolution - both successful and unsuccessful.

Further

study of troubled nations using the same revolutionary criterea
is also urged.

(v)

CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

Between 1969 and 1983 there have been more than 200 articles about
revolution listed in the ABC of Political Science.
talked about and emotional subject.

It is a very widely

While revolution is not commonplace

in today's world, it does occur often enough for us to regard it, not
as Hobbes would have us believe, as an aberration of the political
system, but rather as a part of contemporary political action that is
extremely relevant to the modern student of politics.

The following brief tour of the literature concerning revolutions will
show us that a good working definition is vital.

A revolution is not a

coup d'etat, a bread riot, or necessarily, a civil war.

Revolution is

sufficiently important to be studied in its own right and not just as
a level of civil disobedience.

There are five snares of which writers in this field should be particul
arly aware.

First, revolutions are complex events.

It is tempting,

especially for the political scientist, to advance clear-cut and strong
hypotheses to explain revolutions, but one should be extremely suspicious
of simple causes that are offered to explain complex events.
society is perfect.

Second, no

There are tensions in every society, be it

democratic or non-democratic.

Many of the problems presented as causing

revolutions can be found in almost every society.

There is always

discontent, but this does not have to lead to revolution.
revolution is never inevitable.

Third,

Some theorists get so carries away

with their work that they believe that certain causes "demand" a
revolution.
to the facts.

(1) Fourth, we must always be careful to pay close attention
There is nothing more annoying for a student of politics
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than to be confronted with a theory in which the factual foot has been
forced into the theorectical shoe.

It immediately excites the student's

suspicion and detracts from what might be a very worthwhile undertaking.
Finally, I see no purpose in dressing a theory up in grandiose terms to
make it more scientific.

The causes of revolution are not simple; it

does not promote understanding to make them more obscure by using
esoteric language.

I have been able to include but an extremely small sample of the avail
able literature on revolution.

I do not pretend that the works mentioned

here are necessarily the only important ones on the subject.

I do feel

they are reasonably representative and will give the reader a "feel"
for the subject.

I have divided seven of the ten works that I have

studied into four categories; causal, sociological, psychological and
economic.

The other three works have been used to conclude the chapter

by drawing together the main themes so that I can point to ways in
which I feel future research might usefully proceed.

CAUSAL EXPLANATIONS

Crane Brinton (2) began by outlining some of the problems involved in
writing about revolutions.
for others to follow.

He saw his work as setting the groundwork

His introductory chapter made it clear that he

feels it is imperative for the historian to have a basic conceptual
scheme, rather than just a collection of facts.

This lays to rest the

fallacy that historians and social scientists need to follow contra
dictory paths.

Brinton set to look at the causes of the English, French, American and
Russian revolutions.

While he hoped his findings might be relevant to

other revolutions, he was quick to point out his conclusions only apply
to those he is studying.

He is not writing a general theory of

revolution but one dealing with those four revolutions.
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Brinton began his analysis of the causes of revolution by looking at
the reasons for the decline of the ancient regime.

He realized there

never has been a perfectly happy society and that the job of the
student is to decide whether there is more discontent than normal in
a particular society, and whether this discontent is likely to cause
a revolution.

The first cause that Brinton discussed is that of

economic discontent.

He maintains absolute economic discontent can

add fuel to revolution; yet, as does de Tocqueville, he believes starving
people rarely start a revolution.

It is those groups that feel that

their economic progress is being unfairly hindered that are more
likely to rebel.

Frequently this latter group is also hindered in

social and political spheres.

(A widely used example being the

frustrated middle class in Bourbon France whose political and social
mobility was hindered by antiquated class system).

The other side of the "economic coin" deals with government incompetence.
Brinton noted there is no such thing as perfectly efficient government.
However, the government, in times of revolution, is usually in
particular financial difficulty.

It is when an inefficient, repressive

government tries to instigate civil war that financial difficulties
often cause the government to grant limited reforms which satisfy
nobody and give the revolutionaries hope for their goal.

What role do pressure groups play in promoting political instability?
According to Brinton this depends on what sort of change the group
is seeking and what means it is willing to adopt to bring about such
change.

If a group merely wants to reform facets of the existing

society through constitutional means, its actions are not going to
cause a revolution.

It is when the group wants to replace the existing

society with a totally new one that the chances of revolution increase.

The next symptom of revolution addressed by Brinton is that of the
intellectuals deserting the government.

Again Brinton stated it
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is always the job of the intellectual to criticize the society in which
he lives.

There is no

such thing as a satisfied intellectual.

The

author here asks us to judge both the level of criticism and the
number of intellectuals dissatisfied.
ment, the intellectuals help

Once having deserted the govern

form the revolutionary ideology that

makes that government appear a usurper of power.

Brinton then looked to class struggle as a cause of revolution.
stated there is often class struggle in society.
he looks at is within the ruling class.

He

The first struggle

Inefficient, economically

weak, divided and impotently repressive, the "ruling" class presents
an inviting target for revolutionary overthrow.

Brinton said there probably has never been a society free of class
conflict.

When talking about class conflict, Brinton referred to

tensions between the middle class and the elite.

Members of the

working class seldomly articulate their political thoughts so it is
very hard to discern working class discontent beyond a certain economic
level.

(This economic discontent can manifest itself through such

events as bread riots, strike and desertion from the army).

The

student must decide whether there is more conflict than normal in
society.

Social mobility is likely to play a large role in class conflict.

If

members of the middle class see a relatively good chance of entry
into the ruling elite through existing mechanisms, they are likely
to support that elite.
he studied, there was

Brinton suggested that, within the societies
significant degree of economic mobility,

although socially and politically, there was very little movement.
This is a very dangerous contradiction because when people's expectations
are raised they feel entitled to a political status comensurate with
their wealth.

Brinton also stated that circulation of the elites

stops at particularly sensitive places, such as professions, where
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people whose aspirations are particularly strong find their prospects
limited.

Brinton concluded his analysis of the causes of revolution by commenting
on how difficult it is to predict revolution.
revolution is

a great deal of revolutionary talk, but however astute

we may be, revolution

A revolution,

One sign of imminent

is nearly always a suprise.

Brinton would argue does not start with a bang.

long process.

In its early stages, it is hard to

is taking place.

It is a

say a revolution

While each revolution is, in many ways, different

its beginnings evince important similarities because people acting
in groups often follow certain procedures.

One uniformity in the

revolutions he studied was that governments were always trying to
raise taxes, a measure which a large section of the people felt to
be unjust.

A second uniformity is that the early stages of a revolution

are marked by the polarization of society into two groups: The battle
lines are drawn.
revolution.

A third is the mix of the people involved in the

There is always an alliance, however uneasy, between

the mob and the provocateur.

The final uniformity discovered by

Brinton is a challenge of arms, when the revolutionaries come to
the stage where they can openly challenge the government.
have subsequently agreed with Brinton on this questions.

Many theorists
It would

seem to be widely accepted that no government will fall until it
is militarily weaker than the revolutionaries.
almost impossible to predict.

This is a factor

Brinton summed up the difficulty by

using the term "effective force."

The government may be in command

of a highly modern army, but if that army is not effective in revolu
tionary combat, the government will collapse.

It has now been 45 years since Brinton's book was first published.
Although it has drawn a lot of criticism, modern writers owe a debt
to Brinton.

There are two of his contributions I would specially like
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to stress.

First, the book is extremely sensitive.

aware of the problems of generalizing.
actually happened,

Brinton is well

The revolutions he studied

so it would be all too easy for him to "prove"

why they happened and then to generalize rules to explain all
revolutions.

He recognizes most of the causes of revolution exist

to some degree in every society and it would be extremely difficult
for a contemporary student to forecast revolution.

Second, despite

these problems Brinton is not satisfied, as many historians in his
era were, just to catalogue facts.

He is trying to reach a theory

that can be applied to at least four revolutions.

Nonetheless, there are still some criticisms of his work that are
relevant to our study.

I believe his first mistake is in failing

to define what he is studying.

As there is some doubt as to what

constitutes a revolution, as opposed to coup d'etat or a revolutionary
war, we need to know which events we are considering.
indeed ever an

English or American revolution?

Was there

Second, there are

a few times when Brinton would appear to be making the facts fit
his theory.

In particular I find this to be the case with the

English Civil War.
class although

He talked about the Cavaliers as being the ruling

the conflict cut across borders.

Third, Brinton's

treatment of the roles of pressure groups and intellectuals is some
what questionable.

There are always pressure groups in society, and

to decide when they become particularly influential is extremely
difficult.

Yet, making this determination is easy compared to trying

to fathom whether the intellectuals are more anti-establishment than
usual and whether or not their influence is increasing.

My main criticism of Brinton is that he did not weight his causes
nor does he place them in any chronoligical order.
looking for them?

Do they come together?

When do we start

Are they all of equal

importance, and, if so do they need to follow a certain sequence?
I believe Brinton identified a number of appropriate causes, but
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I would like to be told something of the relationship among them.

The work of Louis Gottschalk, an expert on the French revolution,
differed from Brinton's in that it was intended to be general theory,
rather than limited to four revolutions (3).

Gottschalk began with an analysis of the concept "cause".

He defines

it as "that from which something known as the result proceeds and
without which the thing known as the result cannot happen".
cause must be antecedent to, and connected with, the result.

The
The

cause must be sufficient and necessary to bring about the result.

Gottschalk divided his causes into two categories: immediate and
contributory.

The immediate cause is always the single event without

which the result cannot occur.

Gottschalk used the example of war.

The immediate cause of war is "outbreak of hostilities between two
or more countries."

Knowing the immediate cause is not enough -

we must look for the contributory causes.

Here Gottschalk argued

sensibly that we must make sure our contributory causes are related
to the result.

Once the causes have been established, the student must not fall
into the trap of saying the result must occur.
predetermined.

A revolution is never

Even the most artfully constructed theories can never

take into account the vagaries of human nature.
and sometimes does not, learn from experience.

Man sometimes does,
Heving realized this,

all that we can do is to say that if certain conditions exist within
society one of the outcomes may be revolution.

Gottschalk continued by saying that complex events, such as revolution,
demand complex causes.

He briefly dismisses the Marxist theory of

revolution, not because he perceives it to be wrong, but because
he believes that no monistic theory can adequately describe revolution.
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He identified five main causes of revolution, which can be placed
into three categories.

The first two of these are the contributory

causes and the last is the immediate cause.

His first category is that of demand.

This can be further separated

into two causes, the first of which is provocation.
some reason to want to rebel.
opinion.

People need

The second is crystalized public

For people to start a revolution, they must be convinced

of other people's discontent.

Gottschalk's second category is that of hopefulness.
again embraces two parts.

This category

The first deals with a programm for reform

and the second requires an able leader to draw all the various strands
together.

Gottchalk's immediate cause, the third category, is the weakening
of the ruling elite.

This may come about through a split in the

elite, or by the ruling elite losing the support of the armed forces.
It is only when the conservative forces are sufficiently weakend
that a revolution can occur.

Gottchalk's immediate cause is one which deserves the attention
he devotes to it.

As Eckstein (4) was quick to point out, too much

emphasis has been placed on the revolutionaries and not enough on
the weakness of the ruling elite.
it is worth repeating:

It may seem a trivial fact but

A revolution can never succeed until the

revolutionary forces are stronger than the ones they are trying
to overthrow.

Gottchalk's theory is very useful to the student of revolution.
He made three points that must be emphasized.
noted that a revolution has complex causes.

To begin with, he
Furthermore, he pointed

to the fact that it is necessary for a theory to fit the facts,
not the other way around.

Lastly, he recognized that, human nature
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being what it is, we can never say definitely a revolution will occur.
There are weaknesses in Gottchalk's work.

First, he did not specify

what constitutes demand for a revolution.

It is not enough to say

there must be discontent.

We need to know the type of discontent,

whether absolute or relative, how much it takes to start a revolution
and what framework in which to put it.

While Gottschalk is correct

in saying there must be a weakening of the elite, I think he needs
to say more about the way in which the elite handles the initial
discontent.

The way in which the elite deals with unrest can have

much to do with whether or not that discontent leads to a revolution.
To say there must be solidified public opinion is another point
with which I disagree.

It is not very often that a revolutionary

movement, at least at its onset, enjoys mass support.
is there really need for a program for reform?

Finally,

A revolution might

well be fought to make an unpopular ruler leave, rather than bring
a new ruler to power.

The revolution in Nicaragua was fought out

of hatred of Somoza, rather than love for the Sandinistas.

If Gottschalk's theory is to be used to predict revolution it needs
certain modifications.
much, and when.

We must know what we are looking for, how

The types of discontent have to be specified and

we require a framework in which to place them.
is very useful but must be refined.

Gottschalk's theory
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SOCIOLOGICAL EXPLANATIONS

One of the most widely read writers on revolution is Chalmer Johnson
(5).

He sees revolution as an extreme form of social change, and

then questions the causes of social change.
he sets up a model society.

To answer this question

This society is in equilibrium.

What,

he asks, would upset this equilibrium.

If one component of the system does not work as it should Johnson
called this dysfunction.

If this dysfunction is not rectified,

the whole system will move out of equilibrium.

The social system

suffering from dysfunction is very much like the human body suffering
from cancer.

Therefore he defines social change as "action undertaken

to alter the structure of the system for the purpose of relieving
the condition of dysfunction ". (6)

What makes revolution different from other forms of social change?
First, revolution occurs when peaceful reforms are not forthcoming.
Revolutions are major changes.
are necessarily revolutions.

This is not to say that major changes
There must also be violence, which

usually takes place as the result of multiple dysfunction.

There

is a level of dysfunction within the social system below which
revolution would not be an appropriate form of social change.

Revolution will not occur when the ruling elite is able to isolate
and deal with challenges to the system.

For a revolution to occur,

the "cancer" must spread to more than one "cell" within the social
system.

Johnson states that there are three "accelerators" which

act on the dysfunction to cause revolution.

These are the rise

of a messiah, the birth of a revolutionary political party, or defeat
in a foreign war.

I have five main problems with Johnson's work.

First, I have trouble in accepting his limits of dysfunction.

His

ideal type model is useful, but it leaves us in danger of reducing
his propositions on dysfunction to the level of the tautological.
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If we say revolution does not occur when society reacts non-violently,
we must

be able to set some sort of tolerance levels. If

not, we

are reduced to saying that because there was a

society was unable to adapt non-violently.

we do
revolution

Second, his use of defeat

in a foreign war as a catalyst of dysfunction is too limited.
must take into account
to know

elite weakness as a whole.

more about the sources of dysfunction.

He

Third, I want

I need

toknow whether

all three carry the same weight and how many are needed to cause
a revolution.

Fourth,

I feel that he is too deterministic when

he says certain conditions demand a revolution.

Finally, I feel

revolution is not just an extreme forms of social change, but that
it is a separate phenomenon and its causes need to be treated as
such.

Barrington Moore present another theory of revolution (7) from studying
eight countries Moore identifies three forms ofpolitical development.
(8)

The first of these is the capitalist path of democracy,

Moore

states that Britain, France, and the United States took this path,
the second path is that of a strong capitalist ruling class giving
way to a weak liberal government which, in turn, gives way to Fascism.
The third route is that of the Communist Revolution.

Moore sees

the prime factor in deciding which route was taken as the method
of modernization within the society.

To be more exact, he sees

the mehtod of extracting the surplus from the peasants by the lords
as being crucial.

(9)

Moore would say while no society is immune to revolution, some are
more prone than others.

If the traditional peasant village stays

intact, that society is more susceptible to revolution than one
in which the peasants have already been driven from the countryside.
The lords will try to extract more out of the peasants in order
to keep up with the elites in other, more modern countries.

The

peasants will not only resent this, but their respect for the lords
will be further reduced if the central government takes over the
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lord's function of protector and lawmaker.

On one hand, the peasants will have to suffer economic discontent
and, on the other hand, their traditional value systems will come
under fire from the central government.

Thus, Moore said the society

in which the peasants communities subject to modern pressures and
influence is the most vulnerable to revolution.

Moore's theory is in danger of being tautological.

He said those

countries which follow the capitalist path to democracy do so because
their peasant have been driven off the land at an early stage.
He then said countries that developed along this path are those
that forced the peasants off the land.
to support his theory;

Moore also framed his facts

he attributes both the English Civil War

and the Amercian Revolution to purely economic factors.
the second path ends in Fascism.
even though

He stated

He used Germany as an example,

German Fascism lasted for only 12 years.

Finally,

even if we accept Moore's work, it is of no use to us in predicting
the course of future events, as he himself admitted it is highly
unlikely that any more countries will follow his first two paths.

PSYCHOLOGICAL CAUSES

One of the best known authors in the field of psychological approaches
to revolution is Ted Robert Gurr (10).
as a type of civil disobedience.

Gurr identified revolution

He said we

now know enough about

the sources of human violence to ask what disposes man to collective
violence.

According to Gurr, there are

forms of human aggression.

three traditionally recognized

The first of these is innate, the second

environmentally produced, and the third is a result of aggression,
and instinctive response bought on by frustration.

Gurr sees the

last as being the most fruitful source for further inquiry.

Men

act violently because they are frustrated and angered in trying
to achieve value goals.

Once this anger has been raised, it acts
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on its own.

Any type of violence is an outlet for this anger.

This, then, is Gurr's basic idea:

for a revolution to occur there

must be anger, which is created through the frustration of value
goals.

Gurr stated this theory by using 11 propositions.
into three categories.

These he divides

Category I focuses on instigating variables

to determine the amount of anger.

Category M deals with mediating

variables which determine the likelihood and magnitude of violence
provoked by this anger.

Category F indicates the type of civil

violence which is likely to occur.

Gurr's first proposition,

1.1., deals with relative deprivation.

He defined relative deprivation as the "actors perception of the
discrepancey between their value expectations and the environment's
apparent value capabilities".

(11)

Gurr pointed out it is not enough

for the actor to be deprived he must also perceive himself as being
deprived.

Civil violence occurs when a substantial number of people

feel deprived.

The more widespread the perceived deprivation, the

more widespread the violence.

The inability to reach value goals

is not the only cause of deprivation.

Deprivation is also caused

when people anticipate losing what they already have.

Gurr's next propositions 1.2., I.2A., and 1 .2B., deals with intensity
of the anger people feel when they suffer relative deprivation.
The more committed people are to a goal, and the closer they perceive
themselves to be to that goal, the more anger they will feel when
they cannot attain that goal.

Proposition 1.3., deals with the legitimacy of the authorities when
they prevent people from reaching a goal.

If people feel the author

ities are acting legitimately, they will not be as angry as they
would if they felt that the authorities were not acting legitimately.
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The environment in which people are striving for goals is the subject
of Gurr's propostions 1.4. , and 1.5.

The level of violence depends

on the degree of interference with goal attainment and the number
of attainment opportunities which are interfered with.

Propositions 1.1. to 1.5. deal with the strength of anger felt by
those who suffer relative deprivation.

Propositions M.1. to M.5.

are mediating propositions which deal with the amount of violence
which manifests itself as a result of this discontent.

Gurr's first mediating propositions, M.1. and M.1A. state the amount
of civil violence is proportional to the anticipated reaction of
the authorities.

If people feel the authorities will react with

strong repression, the level of civil violence is likely to be low.

The level of civil violence is also dependent on the time factor.
Propositions M.2. and M.2A. state that if anger is repressed, that
anger will rise.
If

If

repression eases, then violence will increase.

repression continues over a long period of time, the amount

of violence will decrease as people adapt their expectations to
the new environement.

Frustration needs to be stimulated.
experiences and through ideology.

This occurs throught cultural
These experiences clarify the

situation and give the deprived a target for their aggresion.

In

proposition M.4. and M.4A., Gurr declared that while frustration
is still requred for violence, the level of frustration required
to cause a revolution declined when there are these cultural
experience which can stimulate aggression.

Gurr's last mediating proposition, M.5., is concerned with the indi
vidual acting as a part of a crowd. ‘ There are three factors of
crowd action that affect the individual's dispostion towards violence.
The first is the normative aspect.

The individual is more likely to
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act violently if he believes his fellows

feel the same way he does.

The second related to the protection a crowd offers through anonymity,
potential force, and the existence of highly visable leaders who
will assume responsibility for the crowd's action.

The crowd also

provides the individual with a cue for violence.

Gurr's last proposition, F.1. and F.1A., deals with the different
types of violence.

He separates civil violence into two categories;

turmoil and revolution.

He then divides revolution into categories,

internal wars, which typically include civil and guerilla warfare;
and conspiracy, which includes plots and mutinies.

One way to deciding

which type will prevail is to look at the group suffering the discon
tent.

A combination of mass and elite discontent will lead to internal

war, while elite discontent is more likely to promote conspiracy.

Gurr's theory was based on the thesis that civil disobedience is
caused by frustration, which comes about when people are prevented
from reaching value goals.

The way in which this frustration manifests

itself as civil violence depends to a large extent on the reaction of
the existing regime.

The strength of Gurr's theory lies in bringing together information
from two areas of social science.

Nevertheless, there are three

problems that I have with his work.
information used by Gurr?

How relevant is a lot of the

It is debatable whether laboratory experi

ments, occasionaly performed on animals, can have a direct relevance
to the causes of revolution.

Gurr must also be very careful in

his use of historical evidence.

His treatment of both the Plug

Riots and the Luddities leaves a good deal to be desired.

Gurr

is correct in saying that people's perceptions are important, but
if his theory is to be used to predict revolution, we need to be
able to measure the strength of this perceived deprivation.

Finally,

does anger always manifest itself in violence, and if it does, under
what circumstances does this violence seek to bring down the regime?
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My point here is that anger sometimes does not produce violence.
Even when it does it often seeks to remedy a particular grievance,
rather than to bring down the whole regime.

A good example of this

would be an industrial dispute.

ECONOMIC EXPLANATIONS

Perhaps the most famous and influential of all revolutionary theorists
is Karl Marx.

Many comtemporary "Marxist" states would

to be anything but revolutionary.

appear

This should not distract us from

the fact that Marx was, above all, a revolutionary theorist.

(12)

Marx specified two strands of revolution, the social and the human.
What then did Marx believe was the social revolution?
as essentially a producer.

Marx saw man

The history of society could be divided

into stages, each characterized by its own mode of production.

The

asiatic stage was characterized by slave labour, the feudal by serf
labour,

and the capitalist by wage labour.

Within each stage there

was a split between those who owned the means of production and
those who did not.

A new technology developed, the existing mode

of production became outdated, and the ruling class was replaced
by those who controlled the means of production.

The history of society can be seen in terms of class conflict.

This

is for two reasons; because the producing class see their own standard
of living decreasing as a result of exploitation they are suffering
for the ruling class; and, more important, because the working man
is prevented from reaching his full productive capacities.

The socio

economic order prevents man from developing new economic capabilities.

As technology advances, the capitalist mode of production will become
obsolete.

The controllers of the new mode of production, the people,

will take power as a communist revolution comes about.

The rise in

technology will create so much wealth, that greed will disappear.
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To Marx, man is a complete human being.

Under the present mode

of production, such specialization takes place as to prevent him
from being so.

The division of labour must be replaced if man is

to reach complete freedom.

This will happen within the communist

revolution, as machinery will take over the productive role.

Machinery

will then be so advanced that any man will be able to fulfill any
productive role for all he had to do is to work the relevant machine.
The use of machinery will also leave man with more free time to
perform such non-productive roles as art and writing.

The communist

revolution will be the last revolution.

When greed

has been removed and the whole of society owns the means of production,
there will no longer be a class system.

Without class tension there

will be no further revolution.

There are three main criticisms that can be made of Marx's theory.
One, even if we agree that economic causes are important, we are
unlikely to accept them as the only ones.

It would be hard to find

a revolution in which economic discontent did not play a role, but
equally, it would be difficult to find a revolution where political
unrest was not present.

Cuba provides an example of a revolution

started by a class which was not suffering economic hardship.

Two,

for Marx to be correct, there needs to be a high degree of class
conciousness, this does not exist in contemporary society.(13)

Three, it

would seem that the world is not turning out the way Marx said it
would.

There is no evidence to suggest that capitalism is floundering.

Another economic treatment of the causes of revolution was put forward
by J.C. Davies with his "J" curve analysis of relative deprivation.
(14)

The basic hypothesis advanced by Davies stated that revolution

occurs, not when people are starving but rather, when a period of
economic growth is followed by a sharp reversal.
rise when the standard of living rises.

People's expectations

These expectations continue

to rise even when there is sharp economical reversal, which frustrates

Page 18
them.

This frustration is normally manifested in the face of an

intransigent elite who will not give way to the frustrated peoples
social petitions.

They need hope to rebel; and they are too busy

trying to stay alive to give it much thought.

Davies looked at his theory in the light of Dorr's rebellion in 1842,
the Russian revolution of 1918, and the Egyptian rebellion of 1952.

Dorr's rebellion, Davies contended, was the first to occur in the
United States as a result of the Industrial Revolution.

This, and

its date, puts it in the same genre as the Chartist revolts in Britain.
Due to the Industrial Revolution, Rhode Island was urbanized, which
led to a greater dependance on wage labour.
was an economic boom.

From 1807 to 1815, there

From 1834 to 1842, there was a depression.

During this time, those who relied purely on wage income were partic
ularly affected.

It was this group whose expectations had risen

especially high during the boom years, and with the economic
expectations came political expectations.
demands were turned down.
a people's convention.

In 1841 the suffregists

In 1842 they held elections and declared

The authorities stated this to be undemocratic

and a month of widespread rioting followed.

This seems to dovetail

with Davies's theory that a period of economic prosperity, bringing
with it higher expectations, will be followed by a depression.

These

frustrated people were confronted by an intransigent elite.

Davies pinpointed the start of the upsurge toward the Russian revolution
at the emancipation of the

serfs in 1861.

He saw the growing popu

lation rate and the new high wages in the factories as evidence
for

rising expectations.

There were also, he maintained improvements in the legal system
that were to provide hope for more changes.

Expectations continued

to rise until 1905, which Davies say as the point of no return for
the Russian revolution.
of

polarizing people.

The strikes of that year had the effect
The defeat of Russia in the 1904-05 war

with Japan also had two outcomes:

It brought home many disillusioned
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troops, and it shook the confidence of and severley weakened, the
ruling elite.

Davies sees the period of 1905 to 1917 as one of

deepening despair.

In 1910 there was a period of economic prosperity

that raised hopes which were dashed again in the first years of
the war.

Davies said the start of the Egyption upsurge occurred in 1922,
Nationalistic and economic hope rose in 1945.

The post war depression

hit, but there was no revolution due to nationalistic upsurge following
the outbreak of war with Israel.
the government severely.

Defeat in that war was to weaken

The Korean war, and the subsequent cotton

boom, again raised people's expectations, only for them to be dashed
with the collapse of 1952.

Davies continued to consider more cases that fit in with his analysis.
He then looked at a case one might have expected revolution and
yet it did not occur.

The United State in the 1930's would seem

to be a good candidate for revolution.

Davies said one did not

take place there because of a solidified elite that seemed to be
trying to relieve the problems of the poor.

I disagree with Davies on a number of points.

Despite reassurances,

I find it hard to operationalize people's expectations.

Is it enough

to say that because people's living standards are rising, that all
their expectations are rising too, and at the same rate?

If indeed

they are, how long does it take for these expectations to adjust?
Davies's analysis of the Russian revolution is one with which partic
ularly I disagree.

It is not enough to say that the living standard

of the serfs rose in 1861 just because the population rose.

In

many poorer societies the rising population can be attributed to
people trying on one hand to provide for their old age, on the other,
trying to ensure that as many children as possible would survive
owing to the high infant mortality rate.
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The first problem arises out of the question of definition.

Some

social scientists, such as Gurr and Eckstein, would say that we
should talk about a wider concept, such as internal war.

All forms

of civil disobedience, including revolution, use violence, so it
makes more sense to talk of these collectively, rather than to
distinguish revolution.
ulate theories.

Studied this way it will be easier to form

Historians, such as Brinton and Stone, would disagree.

To them the concept of internal war is both too broad and too narrow.
It is too broad because it talks of all forms of internal violence
which are by no means comparable.

It is too narrow because the

concept of internal war is only applicable in non-violent societies.

The next question is whether we look at events and try to draw theories
out of these, or do we look at behavioural theories dealing with
why people act in a certain way.

Gurr would argue it is people's

perceptions that really count. We could point to many different
events with similar causes and then ask why they came out differently.
There is a good deal of truth in this.
perception.

Yet, it is hard to measure

We must take their perceptions into account but must

be willing to change our theories if the facts prove us wrong.

Do we look for a general theory or do we limit our theory to the
cases we actually study?

There can be little doubt that the former

course is the more attractive.

Indeed, there would seem to be no

point in working over the same old revolutions again and again in
the light of some new historical twists.

This makes for interesting

historical analysis but gets the social scientist nowhere in accounting
for the present,

let alone predicting the future.

This is not

to say that we would not analyze some more modern revolution and
to see if standard "causal" theories are applicable.

My final point in this section is that there is a good deal more
agreement here than many theorists admit.
relative

Some factors, such as

deprivation and elite incompetence, are mentoned in almost
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every theory I have evaluated.

There is even a good deal of agreement

that theories

on revolution should be based on preconditions and

precipitants.

One specific example of two, seemingly opposite,

theorists agreeing, is the work of Gottschalk and Gurr.

Both accept

the important influence of the crowd on individual behaviour, but
they approach it from different angles.
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CHAPTER II
A CAUSAL THEORY OF REVOLUTION
I should now like to suggest tentatively my own theory of revolution.
My purpose in so doing is not to attempt to break new theoretical ground.
I do not forecast any new discoveries, because I believe that if a
number of political scientist look at similar events, they are likely to
come up with similiar theories.(1)

However, there are three reasons

why I feel this work to be important.

To begin with, there has been

little or no attempt to try to fit modern revolutions into a causal
model.

A weakness of causal theorists is that they draw their evidence

from the "classical" revolutions.(2)

This reservation may well disarm

the criticism of a new theory that it has no contemporary relevance.
In addition, while this is a causal theory, it will draw heavily on
psychological and sociological work.

Lastly, even though this theory

is not exactly the same as other causal theories, conclusions emerging
from this work may be relevant when looking back at earlier studies.
There is enough in common with studies such as those of Gottschalk and
Brinton for us to

be able to say whether the nations studied here lend

themselves to a causal explanation of revolution.

My reason for out

lining my own theory is not to disprove the finding of others.

I am

more comfortable working with such a theory, and, I hope, it will
prevent my misrepresenting the facts.
All theorists of revolution must start with a definition.

At this

point many theorists will either enter into a thesis-long discussion on
the subject or give up writing.

My definition of a revolutionary move

ment is a mass movement seeking to bring about radical political, social,
economic, and cultural reform through violent means.

This definition

does not set out to be watertight, but rather, a working definition
Before outlining my theory, I would like to point to its limitations
(3), I believe we can never be in a position to say revolution
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is inevitable.

We can only point to certain factors and state that,

if they occur in a given sequence, one of the possible outcomes
is revolution,

furthermore, any conclusions drawn from this work

will apply only to the revolutions studied, but this is not to negate
an earlier point.

I believe it is necessary to compile case studies

which are related to one approach to the subject.

While similarities

may appear, definite conclusions may not follow.

One of the reasons

for the "comparative" weakness lies with differing methodologies,
but, I believe, the main reason lies with human nature and circumstances.
People never react in exactly the same way.

All my theory can do

is to recognize some of the factors that cause revolution, and to
state that where these factors occur, a revolution may follow.

Revolutionary causes appear to fit into three stages.

These are

the preconditions, the precipitants that bring about the revolutionary
situation, and the culmination of all these factors that leads to
the revolutionary spark.
ution.

This spark may or may not lead to a revol

There are also a list of observations which, although they

do not betray any category, give us a valuable insight into the
working revolution.

At this point I would like to introduce an analogy which might make
the rest of this work, a little clearer - that of the fire.
start a fire you need firewood, a precondition.

To

If the wood is

strewn all over the ground, it is of very little use. The firewood
must be gathered and shaped until a stack is created.
is done by the precipitants.

This shaping

The stack is a revolutionary situation.

A spark is then needed to set the fire, or revolution.

Once the

fire has started it will burn more and more fiercely until it all
but burns out, with only the embers still glowing, while we fashion
the wood in any shape we wish, we cannot be certain about the direct
ion the fire will eventually take.

Other factors, such as the wind

and the rain, may come along and change our plans.
true of revolutions.

The same is

We know that there is a revolution taking
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place in Iran and Nicaragua and, although we may try to predict
the outcome, factors other than preconditions and precipitants may
well intervene to alter our predictions.

PRECONDITIONS

What then are the preconditions for a revolution?
are the reasons for discontent within a country.
the willingness of people to rebel.

Preconditions
They account for

They do not have to be immediately

antecendent to the revolution; they can have existed for some time.
They do not have to occur simultaneously but must be cumulatively
sufficient to promote discontent.

Even if all exist we cannot say

that a revolution must take place; all that we can say is that pre
conditions are the most common forms of discontent.
there is little chance of revolution.

Without them,

Unlike certain other students

of revolution, I find that it helps our understanding if we list
these "frustrations".

Perhaps the most important precondition of all is that of economic
discontent.

This must be present for a revolution.

It is not

necessarily the most important factor, but there has been no
revolution in which it played no part whatsoever.

People are extremely

concerned over economic matters and, to put it bluntly, they would
rather eat than vote. (4)

There are two forms of economic discontent

which are of interest to us here: absolute and relative deprivation.
In the last chapter, I noted that theorists such as Gurr, de Tocqueville,
and Davies disagreed with Marx when he stated it is absolute deprivation
which makes man rebel.

I would add that it is not a question of

either absolute or relative deprivation.

A revolution is caused

by a coalition of people, some driven by absolute deprivation, and
some by relative deprivation.
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Most people, at some time or other, perceive themselves to be deprived.
Yet the remedy is seldom revolution.

How do you decide when deprivation

is strong enough to lead men to rebel?
is comparatively straight forward.

Measuring absolute deprivation

Here we need to look at harvest

records, mortality records, and accounts of discontent caused by
lack of food, such as bread riots.
so easy.

Relative deprivation is not

In this case we are dealing with perceptions.

tell if a man is not getting food.

We can

However, we cannot tell if he perceives

himself to be getting less food than he deserves.
angles from which we might consider this question.

There are two
Davies had a

point when he said one method would be to measure people's living
standards.

It is a reasonable suggestion that if living standards

rise, as measured by per capita income, ownership of consumer durable
goods (such as television, etc) housing conditions, death rates,
illiteracy rates etc

they will be expected to continue.

If living

standards

do not continue to rise in line with expectations,

people

will feel

deprived.

Yet, this is only one way of looking at

the

question.

I believe

that it will differ between cultures as

to

how much expectations risp, and how quickly they will adjust to a
reverse.

People who have suffered reversals in the past will be

much better able to adapt than those who have not (5).

I think,

therefore, we must also analyze carefully the literature produced
by those suffering discontent and try to discover from these works
why people are discontented.

If people act because of their perception,

they also write because of them.

In this way

we will have a better

understanding of the causes of rebellion.

If a revolution were caused by economic discontent alone, the world
would be in a state of constant revolt.
plays a key causal role.

Political discontent also

The existing regime must use its repressive

capabilities - namely the military, the police and legal system,
and propaganda, to prevent effective political opposition.

If the

regime allows opposition, there is a good chance that this opposition
will work for reform.

A possible revolutionary situation will therefore
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be diffused.

By allowing the opposition a say in the decision

making process, the regime is working at the root of possible
discontent.

If the regime allows no opposition, pressure for

revolution will build.

The chances of revolution in modern America or Britain remain slim
as long as there remains abundant opportunity to voice discontent,
and reasonable access to the decision-making

process.

In nations

such as fuedal France, Batista's Cuba and 20th Century Iran, such
opportunity was not present.

This gave those discontented with

the governing regime no alternative but to revolt.

My third precondition is that of ideology.

By ideology I am referring

to a collection of beliefs and values which hold the various strands
of the revolutionary movement together.

For this ideology to be

revolutionary, it must be contrary to the ideology of the ruling
elite.

Ideologies are extremely important because they give people

something around which to unite.

The most important role of ideology

is that of legitimizing the revolt and converting into a moral struggle.
People who believe they are fighting for what is right are far more
likely to be willing to sacrifice their lives than are those interested
soley in economic gain.

Ideology has played a vital part in revolution:

Marxism in the Russian revolution, religion in the Iranian revolution,
and humanism in the French revolution.

PRECIPITANTS

There will be no revolution without precipitants to transform the
preconditions into a revolutionary situation.

I see the precipitants,

effective leadership, ineffective reaction of the regime to existing
discontent, and inability of the regime to hold on to power through
physical force.
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Leaders have a crucial role to play in precipitating a revolution.
They are needed to organize the revolution movement and to articulate
the ideology.

In the cases where the movement is fragmented, leaders

are needed to bring the fractions together through coalitions, giving
the people a united front to support.

The crucial role of the leaders

is to give the people hope, a vital part of the success of any
revolution.

People need to know that they are not fighting alone

and that the sacrifices they are making will not be in vain.

A

classic example of the role of leadership has been seen in Cuba.
While it is undeniable that there was considerable economic and
political discontent in Cuba, without Fidel Castro's involvment
the revolution might not have taken place.

Batista may well

have

been weak; but without someone to challenge him he could well have
stayed in power.

Once it has been established that there is economic and political
discontent in a country, the way in which the regime reacts to the
discontent is crucial to the outcome of the revolution.
the preconditions, the chances of revolution are reduced.

If it attacks
However,

there are three approaches the government might select, or a combination
of all three, that are likely to increase the chances of revolution.
First, the government may try to repress mercilessly the movement.
This repression is usually highly indiscriminate, and there is no
attempt to discern between the revolutonaries and the population
at large.

Second, a government may tend to ignore the unrest and

try to carry on as usual.

Third, the government may grant piecemeal

reform that does not resolve the problems at hand.

The third approach

is the least likely to work in diffusing a revolutionary situation.
The only real answer for the regime is to

try and deal with the

causes of discontent and attempt to create a power base within society.

(6 )
A regime will fall if it has no legitimacy, and relies purely on
military means for survival.

The length of time it stays in power
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will depend on the effective strength of its military and police.
Put simply: the regime will fall when it is weaker than the forces
trying to overthrow it.

The strength of the revolutionary forces

is clearly important but there will be no revolution unless the
conservative forces are weakened.
measure.

This weakness is impossible to

All we can do is look for signs, such as economic and

political discontent among the military; low morale, poor training
and equipment, and lack of combat experience.

Weakening of the regime can take place in a number of ways.

The

government may have been involved in overseas wars that have devastated
the economy and provoked discontent.
and Portugal.

Prime examples are Russia

Economic problems may have lead to each regime's

inability to buy off political discontent.

This often happens when

the bourgeoisie has been willing to tolerate a denial of political
power in return for economic benefits.

When there benefits are

withdrawn, the middle class will withdraw its political support
from the government.

Revolutions are often started by a politically

alienated bourgeoisie and an example of this is the French Revolution.
This group has the political knowledge to make their protest effective,
the regime might also be further weakened by dependence on a foreign
power which then withdraws its support.

Examples here would be

the withdrawal of U.S. support from the Shah's Iran and from Gemayel's
Lebanon.

Gottschalk, with good reason, pointed to the repressive capability
of the regime as the key factor in bringing about a revolution.
Even if all the other preconditions and precipitants are present,
the regime will not fall if it is militarily strong enough to retain
power.

The present-day government of Afghanistan, for example,

will not fall as long as it is supported by the military might of
the Soviet Union.
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CONCLUSIONS

When these preconditions and precipitants converge, we can say we
have a revolutionary situation which may or may not turn into a
revolution.

If it does, there are specific events that indicate

a revolution is taking place.

One such of these was the flight

of the Shah of Iran from Teheran in 1978.

This is not to say that

the revolution will necessarily succeed, but rather that it is underway.

There are some additional points which are pertinent to our discussion.
If, when the old regime is toppled, there is no mass movement, it
is not a revolution.
a "palace coup".

It is merely a circulation of elites,

In this respect,

perhaps

I would say the English Civil

War was not a revolution because society was still dominated by
the same class.

Further, revolutions are unlikely to take place

in urbanized, industrialist, pluralistic democracies.

The political

institutions in these states are too well established and considered
too legitimate for the regime to fall.

Any discontent is channeled

through these institutions, avoiding a potentially dangerous situation.
Even if discontent manifests itself by other means, the regime is
unlikely to fall, becuase the state possesses such powerful repressive
regulatory mechanisms as the socialization process, the media and
the military, with which to counter a revolutionary organization.
If the state is forced to rely on such mechanisms, it might eventually
fall.

To maintain long term stability, the state must enjoy legitmacy.

Whilst recognizing that revolution seldom occurs in modernized states,
I must also point out that they are unlikely to occur in primitive states.
In such states people are more concerned with staying alive than with
revolution.

It is on those countries undergoing change and in which

fundamental values are being challenged that revolution is most likely
to occur.(7)

It was during this phase that Cuba, Iran and Nicaragua

underwent revolution.

It was during modernizing phase that Britain

came closest to revolution.
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Finally, you cannot have revolution through reform.

To achieve

a revolution, you must exterminate those groups within society that
oppose you.

This can either be done by expelling dissidents or

by eradicating them through a reign of terror.

By attempting to

achieve revolutionary goals through existing power structures, you
are continuously fighting vested interests that will eventually get
in your way.

A good example of where a revolution failed for just

this reason is Chile.

By having to work through conservative

politicians and not being able to reform the military, Allande faced
a difficult task.

I began this discussion by asking whether a theory

of revolutions is possible and concluded that it is.

My theory

states that to bring about a revolutionary situation, you need economic
political and ideological preconditions.

These are then acted on

by the precipitants of leadership, the reaction of the existing
regime to unrest within society and the military strength of that
regime.

My theory does not indicate if all the factors outlined are present
there must be a revolution.

All it says is that if these factors

are present, one of the possible outcomes would be a revolution.
It is also true that no single revolution is exactly the same as
another.

This means no single theory can explain every facet of

every revolution without being so vague that it means nothing.

I

do think revolutions have enough in common for us to tentatively
postulate a theory of revolution.

This theory has enough in common with other causal theories to be
Tabled as such.
to

As a consequence, the purpose of this paper is

look at the revolutions in Cuba, Iran and Nicaragua to see,

not only whether or not they fit my theory, but also to see whether
they fit causal explanations in general.
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CHAPTER III
THE CUBAN EXPERIENCE
There are, as Goldenberg pointed out, a number of fallacies circulated
concerning the Cuban revolution.(1)

The purpose of this chapter is

to expose some of these fallacies and to determine the compatibility
of the Cuban

experience to mytheory.

However, at the onset there

is a problem

concerning data, which is the case with most Latin American

Countries.(2)

The most recent "reliable" pre-revolutionary statistics

are those of

the 1953 census.

These must be taken into context in as

much as 1953

was not a good year for the Cuban economy.(3)

Another problem is deciding with which countries to compare Cuba.

The

question is whether to compare Cuba with the rest of Latin America, or
with its neighbour, the United States.

A good example of this dilemma

can be seen when looking at literacy figures.
people over 10 years of age were literate.

In 1953, 76.4% of Cuban's

This would have put Cuba

fourth among Latin American States, yet this figure would be unsatis
factory when compared with the United States.(4)

Even if we decide

to concentrate on Latin America, we have problems concerning which
countries to compare Cuba with, and which factors to choose for such
a comparison.(5)
Which, then, are the fallacies I would like to expose?

The picture

has been given of Cuba as a slave-based colony of the United States,
centered totally on sugar.

The exploited peasants of this underdeveloped

nation rose to overthrow the tyrant, Batista.(6)

This was simply not

the case.
It would be hard to argue that Cuba was making the best of its potential,
but this is not the same as saying it was underdeveloped.

Sugar was

extremely important to the economy, and culture, but less than 25% of
the population made a direct living from growing
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sugar.

As Theodor
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Draper asserts;
In short, a social interpretation on the Cuban revolution
must begin with a view of Cuban society that is far more
urban, far less agrarian, far more middle class, far less
backward, than it has been made to appear.
In Castroist
propaganda and the speeches of Castro himself, one of the
most complex and advanced Latin American countries has been
flattended out into a one-dimensional, hopelessly backward,
agrarian fantasy that "has not developed economically or
technically for dozens of years".(7)

There can be no doubt that conditions for the peasants in the mountains
were hard.(8)

Yet to focus on this is to miss the point.

conditions were

There

typical and there never was, until just before

Batista's fall, a large peasant army.

Cuba, like all nations had

its problems, but it is only with hindsight that we can see how they
led to revolution.

It was not clear until Batista fled the country

that there would be a successful revolution.

Not only was it not clear that there would be a revolution in Cuba,
but, it was also not clear that Fidel Castro would lead it. Given
the role that Communist played in the revolution, it is even more
surprising to note their role in post-revolutionary Cuba.

By examining

the causes of the Cuban revolution, the following analysis seeks
to put these questions into perspective.

There are three questions we need to consider if we are going to
shed light on the causes of the Cuban revolution.
which class accomplished the revolution?

To begin with,

One side of the argument

would term it a middle-class revolt, while the official party line
would say it was a peasant-oriented agrarian revolt.(9)

Moving on,

what exactly was the economic position within Cuba before the revolution?

Finally, what was the extent, and the effect, of U.S. involvement
in Cuba?

I hope to answer these questions in the following analysis.

I would like to begin by repeating my definition of a revolutionary move
ment; "A revolutionary movement is a mass movement seeking to bring about
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radical, political, social and economic change through violent means".
How well does the Cuban experience fit this definition?

To answer this question by stating that Fidel Castro's forces in
the Sierra Maestra were the revolutionary movement in Cuba, would
be taking a very simplistic point of view.
group was not a mass organisation.
tacit support given to Castro.
800 men.(10)

To begin with, Castro's

We do not know the amount of

We do know his "army" never exceeded

It might be argued that Castro was the leader of a

much larger movement.

To be sure, there were many other such groups

but they were in no way subordinate to Castro.(11)

Despite attempts

at unification, these groups were very much autonomous units.

Was there a mass movement?

When Batista fell, the mass of the people

were content with this overthrow.

As evidence for this statement

I would point to the celebrations which met, and the lack of resistance
to, the defeat of Batista.

The size of Catro's army, put by most

observers at fewer than 1,000 men, would seem to indicate there was
no mass movement actively seeking Batista's overthrow.

It is more

likely that while only a small number of men led the fight against
Batista, they were representing a majority of the people in their
wish to see him depart.

Therefore, there is no evidence to suggest

there was mass movement trying to overthrow Batista, only that the
revolutionary movement had at least tacit support.

The next question is whether this movement pursued radical reform.
There would be two good reasons for saying it did not:

The statements

of the revolutionary leadership point to nothing more radical than
a wish for the reinstatement of the 1940 constitution.

(12)

Furthermore,

two groups supporting Castro, the younger middle class and the peasants
from the Sierra Maestra, did not want radical reform.

Elements within

the bourgeoisie supported Castro because they felt the Cuban economy
was stagnant, due to cumbersome labour laws and government corruption.
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While they wanted these obstacles removed, they certainly did not
want nationalization of industries.

The peasants who supported Castro

wanted agrarian reform, but not of the genre later provided by Castro.
They wanted to own their own land and had little enthusiasm for the
collective farms instigated by Castro.(13)

The reforms instituted by Castro, once he had assumed power, were
evidence enough of how radical he truly was.(14)

His moderate pre

revolutionary stance can be ascribed perhaps to both his immature
political philisophy and his need to gather widespread support for
his movement.

However his swift replacement of moderate members

of his cabinet is a further indication of where his sympathies lay. (15)

In 1958 there was a considerable group who advocated the overthrow
of Batista.

There were also leaders who wanted to see radical reform,

but this is not to say that all those sought the overthrow of Batista
agreed with all that Castro did after the revolution.
much an anti-Batista rather than a pro-Castro movement.

This was very
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PRECONDITIONS

Was there sufficient economic discontent in Cuba to cause a revolution?
In dealing with Cuba it is important to notice the very close tie
between economic and political discontent.

It is also necessary

to link those who suffered with those who rebelled.

It is not enough

to point to suffering as a cause of revolution unless it is the people
who suffered who also revolted.

There are three angles from which I would like to approach this problem.
In the first place, I would like to ask how much absolute deprivation
there was in Cuba, and whether this helped the revolutionary movement.
I would then like to consider how much relative deprivation there
was on the island.

Finally, I shall look at some of the nation's

problems that led to a weakening of the economy.

Cubans can be divided between those who worked in the city and those
who worked on the land.

For the purpose of this discussion, I am

going to concentrate on the rural population.

According to the census

of 1953, 817,000, or 42% of the working population worked on the
land.

The sugar industry employed 474,053 of these.

Work in the

sugar industry was seasonal, and at harvest time the unemployment
was a bearable 8%.

When it was not harvest time, unemployment rates

reached 32%, or more than the U.S. unemployment rates during the
great depression.(16)

The majority of workers were tenant farmers.

In the 1930's, legislation had been passed to give them security
of tenure at a very low rent.

Those who were especially badly hit

by seasonal trends were the squatters.

While they accounted for

only 8% of the agricultural population, they were centred around
the Sierra Maestra.(17)

Even Castro agreed that during Batista's term income was being more
evenly distributed in Cuba.

He wrote

Since 1933 Cuban distributive policy has, as the result
of wage increases, the introduction of the eight-hour day
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paid holidays, social insurance etc, brought about
a juster distribution of the national income.(18)

In certain rural districts of the country there was still abject poverty.
(19)

It was in these regions, especially the Sierra Maestra, that

Castro gained, at least tacit, support.

Yet if we are looking for

a revolution caused by absolute deprivation this is
to turn.(20)
(21)

not the place

Cuba was, on a Latin American scale relatively prosperous.

Though it is undoubtably true that Castro gained support from

the poor this was not his only, nor even main, recruiting ground.
We must look further for an adequate economic interpretation of the
Cuban revolution.

The question of relative deprivation is, as I commented in my introduction,
a tricky one.

It is hard to work with people’s perceptions.

The most

active groups in the Cuban revolution were the students and the younger
members of the middle

and professional classes.(22)

How far can

we point to relative deprivation as a reason for this discontent?
There are two forms of economic frustration which are of interest
here.

While the older members of the middle class made money from

farming and business, and were therfore quite happy with the Batista
regime, their sons were being drawn into the liberal professions and
to the government bureaucracy.
so many in these fields.

However, the economy could not support

These young graduates, whose expectations

were raised through their university education, faced limited chance
of professional employment, and a corrupt government bureaucracy.
Those who were technically trained became increasingly disillusioned
with Cuba's fast stagnating economy, and became more and more attached
to the idea of replacing Batista.(23)

Cuba was an Island with great economic potential.

More than 70% of

its land was fertile and 50% of it was arable compared with only 6%
in Nicaragua, and 8% in Iran.(24)
labour and capital.(25)

In addition Cuba had plentiful

The problem was not that Cuba was backward,
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as Draper cited.
Although Cuba's potentials for development clearly have
not been fully utilized, these comparisons show that it
is a mistake to think of Cuba as a seriously underdeveloped
country.(26)
What then were the main problems with the Cuban economy?
the Cuban economy was still centered around sugar.

Firstly

While it is a

mistake to think of Cuba as a one-crop economy, sugar accounted for
80% of the nation's export earnings.(27)
this:

There were two reasons for

First, the climate and soil were perfect for sugar growing.

Second, the United States provided an

extremely lucrative market.

This had three main consequences: high unemployment due to

the seasonal

nature of the industry, restricted diversification into other fields
and a reliance on world market forces outside Cuba's command.

The second economic problem involved Cuba's dependant relationship
with the Unted States.

The question is whether Cuba lost or gained

from its close links with its northern neighbour?
must be placed the massive U.S. investment in Cuba.
firms invested, by 1960 $1,000 million.

On the credit side
North American

More than 160,000 people

were employed by these firms, 90% of whom were Cubans.

In 1957 American

firms spent $70 million in taxes - 20% of the Cuban budget.(28)

On

the debit side were American pressure on Cuba to develop sugar and
the quota system which the United States later employed.
Cuba gained from its relationship with the United States.

On the whole,
This did

not stop the revolutionaries from complaining about "economic slavery".
What was really needed was a strong Cuban government which could
negotiate with the United States use Cuba's resources to diversify
and modernize.

The third major problem with the Cuban economy wa the top-heavy ineff
icient beauracracy.

In 1950 nearly 80% of the budget was used to

pay officials and holders of sinecures.

In the same year, approximately

11% of the working population, half the number employed in the sugar
industry, was employed by the government.
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Cuba was not economically underdeveloped.

Some of its peasants suffered

dire hardship largely due to underemployment, but this was not really
the cause of revolution.

However, the economy was stagnating.

This

was particularly frustrating to the generation of students and young
middle-class professionals.

The United States made a perfect scapegoat,

and Batista's handling of the situation did nothing to improve matters.

It must be with this last point in mind that we turn our attention
to the political unrest which existed in Cuba.

There can be little

doubt that the economic discontent in Cuba, on its own, was not enough
to cause a revolution.

While it is difficult to draw the line between

economic and political discontent, it would seem to make sense to
identify political discontent as more important than economic.

For

the purpose of this section I would like to look at who revolted and
why.

I would also like to consider the political background against

which this took place.

The United States has a long history of inter

vention in Cuban affairs.

By the 1890's Americans had $30 million

invested in the Cuban sugar industry, with the result that 10% of
Cuban sugar was processed by American Mills.

In 1898 the United States

intervened in Cuba's wars of independence with Spain.

In 1902 Cuba

received independence, and the Platt Ammendment, which gave the United
States the legal right of intervention in Cuban internal affairs.(30)
On August 13, 1933, President Gerardo Machado fled the country in
the midst of serious unrest, the result of which was the coming to
power in 1935 of Fulgencio Batista.

Batista instituted free elections

for a national constitutional assembly which drew up the progressive
1940 constitution.

Surprisingly, in 1944, Batista's appointed successor,

Dr. Carlos Saladrigas, was defeated by the Autenticos party, which
was to hold the Presidency until Batista once again seized power in
1952.

The brief introduction to Cuban political history demonstrated

both the U.S. influence in Cuban affairs and the lack of a stable
political culture.

Against this background, what sparked the political unrest that led
to Batista's overthrow?

When Batista took power on March 10, 1952,
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he

was running third, behind Dr. Robert Agramonte and Dr. Carlos Hevia

in

the polls for the upcoming presidential

he took power illegitimately.

election.

To put it simply,

Batista obtained cooperation from the

army and police, thanks to considerable

pay increases.

The demands

of the economic rather than political urban working class were satisfied,
mainly by the social benefits granted by Batista.(31)

Their lack

of political protest is summed up by their refusal to strike on April 9,
1958.

Two main groups opposed Batista, and forced an uneasy alliance which
was to
of

cause his ultimate downfall.

These were the bourgeois remnants

the Autentico and Orthodix parties, and students, mainly from the

University of Havana.

(The two revolutionary groups coming out of

the Autentico Party were: the Friends of Aureliana (AAA), and the
Autentico Organisation (OA).)

The student opposition to Batista stated as soon as he took power.
Castro himself instigated a case in the Supreme Court which sought
a judicial finding that Batista's takeover was unconstitutional.
Needless to say, this effort was treated with disdain.

On May 20, 1952,

a mass meeting at the University called for resistance to Batista.
This opposition did not stop until the overthrow of Batista.

The

cause of political discontent, at least, is clear: Batista's illegal
capture of power.

How prevalent a role did ideology play in

the Cuban revolution?

To answer this question we need to look at the importance of ideology
before and after the revolution took place.

There is very little trace of ideology before the revolution.

Draper

argued that "during the struggle for power and for about a year or
two after power had been won, Castroism seemed to be a movement without
theory or ideology".(33)

Two factors buttress this conclusion:

it was in Castro's interest to be ideologically vague.

First,

In this manner,

he could promise everything to everybody and not attract criticism
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because of an ideological stance.
not of theory.(34)

Second, Castro was a man of action

It was Che Guevara who was to become the main

theorist, after the revolution was successful.

Guevara began his formulation of Castroism in January 1959.

Castroism

is basically Cuban, but can be applied in principle to the whole of
Latin America, according to Guevara.

The theory revolves around,

and glorifies the role of the peasant fighter.

Deemed the vanguard

of revolution,(35) because of his commitment to the overthrow of
illegitimate

institutions, Guevara was fighting for agrarian reform.

It was not necessary for favourable conditions to pre-exist, they
could be created.

How much is this theory based on the struggle to overthrow Batista,
and how far was it intended to justify Castro's political fight after
Batista's fall?

There can be little doubt that the rudiments of this

theory came out of the Sierra Maestra.

The early part of Guevara's

work appeared in early 1959, and most of it could be drawn from speeches
that Castro made around the same date.

Due to the split in the revolu

tionary alliance between the former underground resistance and the
rebel army, it is clear that it was in Castro's interest to emphasize
the role of the peasant fighter in the struggle to overthrow Batista.
While Guevara denied it strenuously, a good deal of his thoeory on
guerilla warfare would appear to have inflenced by Mao's work on the
same subject.(36)

Guevara must have learned many of his lessons throught practical
experience.

However, even if his theory was original, we cannot place

too much emphasis on a piece of work formulated after an event.

I

am skeptical as to how much effect a non-formulated theory would have
on revolutionary morale.
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PRECIPITANTS

The first of my precipitants is the role of leaders in a revolutionary
struggle.

What is Castro's role in this model?

No doubt that charismtic

young lawyer played a central part in the overthrow of Batista just
as he continues to play the leading role in contemporary Cuba.

A

discussion of his personal attributes and rise to power, though
fascinating subject, lies beyond the scope of this paper.
anyone have succeeded when he did?

a

Could

The best way to answer this question

is to ask why Castro won power when so many other failed.

The Cuban revolution was not inevitable.

Moreover,

it was not certain

that Castro would lead the movement to overthrow Batista.

Why then,

did the competing organizations fail?

Three reasons help account for the failure of these organizations. To
begin with, there was a lack of coordination between groups.

Even

when they did work together, as in the Montreal accord of June 2, 1953,
the results were unsatisfactory (37)

Second, while the students were

enthusiastic, their plans were often badly conceived, as exemplified
in the abortive March 1957 attempt on Batista's life.

Finally, these other groups faced one more problem;

Castro himself.(38)

Not only did he want Batista overthrown, Castro was determined to
be the one to do it.

He never gave up his committment to the revolution

nor his conviction that a successful revolution could take place.
His ability to inspire, and perceived concern for those around him
made Castro one of Latin America's great leaders.
to

It would be impossible

overemphasize the role Castro played in the Cuban revolution.

As we have seen, Batista ignited the political discontent through
his illegitimate seizure of power in 1952.
discontent?

How did he deal with this

Though nobody really knows the result of the Batista

terror, it would seem that official reports of 20,000 dead are far

Page 45
from accurate.(39)

It was an inefficient and indiscriminate affair.

(Army mopping-up campaigns probably did the best job of recruiting
peasants into Castro's army).
the facade of

Batista was still trying to maintain

a semi-democratic nation, but by allowing a degree

of press freedom and by granting the "Moncada Amnesty", Batista was
promoting his downfall.
were untrue.

Legends of Batista's working 16 hours a day

It is said that when he should have been organizing

a campaign to defeat Castro, he was too busing playing Canasta.(40)

Batista fled the country on December 31, 1958.

The "army" with which

Castro confronted him numbered fewer than 1,000 men.

Batista's regime

collapsed with the minimum amount of pressure from Castro.

Without

denigrating the role of Castro, the Cuban revolution is the story of
the fall of Batista rather than the rise of Castro.

Batista had never managed to legitimize his power.
and the peasants were, at best, apathetic.

The working class

Student groups and other

elements of the middle class constantly agitated against him because
they felt that he had seized power illegally.

This seizure and the

stagnation of the economy was resented by professional sections of
the Cuban bourgeoisie.(41)
support of his generals.

Batista did not even have the unconditional
In the days before Castro took power, his

senior officers were negotiating with Castro to save themselves at
Batista's expense.

Even had it remained loyal, Batista's army could not have kept him
in power.

The upper echelons of his officer corps, including Tabernilla,

was staffed by his friends and relatives, rather than by able officers.
This had the further effect of alienating the very soldiers who might
have been able to save Batista.

The peasant soldiers were abominably

paid and had no wish to stand and fight.
before contacting the rebels.(42)

They often retreated even

To make matters worse, Cuba's army

had virtually no military experience.
damaged army morale even further.(43)

The withdrawal of U.S. support
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CONCLUSIONS

Cuba resists inclusion in any revolutionary model.

Guevara stated

there were factors exceptional about the Cuban revolution but that
it constituted a model which Latin America could follow.

It does,

however, make sense to talk about the revolution as a Cuban experience.
It is interesting to note that in countries where Castro has encouraged
revolution, such as Nicaragua, he has done so along the lines most
suited to that individual nation.

How germane then is the Cuban experience to that presented in the
previous chapter?

The Cuban revolution is not a precise example

of my theory in practice.

There was neither deep-seated economic

discontent nor serious ideological content.
strong, these preconditions were present.

However, while not
What is important to

note is that my theory states some preconditions are stronger than
others.

The weighting of these conditions depends on the particular

nation.

It would have taken a very sensitive analysis of Batista's

Cuba to predict the revolution.

When you bring together the strength

of the political discontent, the force of Castro's personality,
and the real, not apparent weakness of the Batista regime, it would
be possible to foresee the revolution.

The first step is to appraise

realistically the preconditions and the precipitants.

The next

step is to recognize the differing strengths of these factors, not
to attribute false strengths and weaknesses.

The last step is to

see whether the case study fits, by a careful balancing of the first
two steps.

It would, therefore, have been possible to predict the

Cuban revolution, but extremely difficult.
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CHAPTER IV

REVOLUTION IN IRAN

In 1972 Iran became part of the "Nixon Doctrine."
this policy,

The object of

following the recent debacle in Vietnam,

was to use

key sympathetic nations to further U.S. interests without deploying
American troops.

President Nixon believed Iran sufficiently strong

and stable to play such a role.
this doctrine remained.
a surprise to many.(1)

While Presidents came and went,

The unrest in Tehran during 1978 came as
Though events are only inevitable through

handsight, the causes of the disturbance on September 8, 1978(1),
can be traced through Iranian history.(2)

Any student of violent

unrest needs to decide when relevant causes begin.

If he chooses

a date that is too early, he is likely to focus on many irrelevant
factors.

If the date he chooses is too late, he is likely to overlook

many important causes.

In the context of this analysis, I will

be looking at Iran from 1963 to 1979.

I am aware that 1906(3) and

1953(4), could be selected as suitable starting dates,

Any dates

must be arbitrary; however, I believe that the dates on which I
have decided proved a comprehensive historical background, whilst
focusing on those events which were directly relevant to the revolution.

From 1962 to 1979, a number of problems beset the seemingly peaceful
Iranian state.

This chapter emphasizes three of these: the conflict

between a modernizing state and

the Islamic culture;

the political

expectations of the middle class; and the economic inadequacies
of the regime.

The objective of this chapter is to determine the relevance of the
Iranian Revolution to my theory.

In pursuing this goal, I will
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look at whether the Iranian revolution was inevitable.

I want to

determine if the difficulties involved in bringing about a peaceful
transition from a backward state to a modern industrialized nation
could have been overcome.

Was the revolution a product of these

tensions or did it come about through the shah's incompetent handling
of the 1978 crisis?

Before proceeding, we must establish whether there was revolutionary
movement in Iran.

In answering this question, I am taking no account

of what happended after Ayatollah Khomeini(5) came to power.

I

am reviewing the movement that forced the shah to leave Iran in
1979.

There can be little doubt that a large number of people wanted

a radical change in how Iran was being governed.

The demonstrations,

stikes and other protests, indicate the number of people involved.(6)

In contemplating the change desired by the movement we must examine
its leadership.

As with most large organizations, the movement

which sought the overthrow
smaller groups.

of the shah was

a coalition of many

The movement consisted of religious fanatics, students,

politicians, professionals and guerillas.

They shared a desire

to see the end of the shah's political control.(7)

These leaders

could not agree on the type of society they wanted; they could only
agree on the society they did not want and they were well supported
by the discontented masses.

PRECONDITIONS

Was there sufficient economic discontent to spark a revolution in
Iran?

There are three angles from which to approach this question.

To begin

with, I will consider the economic discontent in the

countryside,

the shah's agrarian reform and the effects of this

discontent on the revolution.

Next, I will examine the economic

weaknesses of the regime itself.
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What were conditions like in the countryside?
government deal with the situation?

How did the shah's

What did all this have to do

with the revolution?

One of the chief problems in Iran was the

lack of arable land.

Only 5%, 8 million hectacres(8), were cultivated

on a regular basis.

Before the "White Revolution", the basic unit

of land ownership was the village.

A group of 400-(9) 450 families

owned more that 60% of this land, with the result that only 5% of
the peasants owned the land on which they worked.

Various means of sharecropping were used to extract the product
from the land. The most common of these was to divide the crop into
five inputs-land, labour, water, animals and seed.

Landowners automatically received 20% of the product, the few animal
owners share 20%; the workers with a share in the product divide 20%
among themselves; and the landless labourers worked for whatever
the landowners would pay them.

This resulted in a village hierarchy

of landowners, animal owners, those entitled to the traditional
labour share, and casual workers.(11)

The shah launched his program in January 1962 under the slogan of
"land to the tiller".

There were three stages to his plan.

Under

the first, the government undertook the redistribution of land from
landowners to peasants, with restrictions on the amount of land
that any one owner could hold.

This stage reached 30% of Iranian

villages and had the effect of giving the land to the relatively
well-to-do peasants.

The second stage started in 1965, and covered

land not already affected by the first stage.

Landowners were now

given five ways in which to transfer land to the peasants; the principle
one being to lease the land.
80% of the peasants.

This was intended to reach more than

The third phase, designed to increase agricult

ural production, encouraged the recipient peasants to participate
in the state run agri-corporations.

Major economic consequences came from this prgrame of land reform,
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even though those who had nothing before it began continued to have
nothing as a consequence.
was created.
to

invest

A new class, the wealthy bourgeoisie,

Many landowners sold land and moved
their

money

in industry.

Many

into
of

the

cities

these

new agri-corporations did nothing to increase food production and,
by

forcing the peasants off the land, caused increased unemployment.

Through these measures the shah was also able to increase his control
over

the countryside.(12)

There is very little evidence of agrarian unrest in Iran, and that
which there was tended to be sporadic.

Whatever the conditions

of the peasants before or after the revolution, it was the cities
from which the shah faced a threat and not from the countryside.
In

this respect, it is the third phase

is

important.

First, the unemployment caused by agri-business spurred

migration into already
to

of the agrarian reform, that

swollen cities.Second, this stage failed

produce enough food for the rapidly expanding economy.

ation of food led to ever-spiraling prices:

The import

Prices rose 250% between

1969-1978.(13)

Iran's sustained

growth rate was remarkable.

product

8% per annum in the 1960's,by 30.3% in 1973-1974,

rose by

The gross national

and by 42% in 1974-1975.

The GNP grew from $17.3 billion in 1972

to $54.6 billion

in1978.

The per capita GNP

in 1972 to $2400

in 1978.(14)

rose from around $500

There was economic unrest in urban Iran, not because of absolute
deprivation, but because people failed to obtain the goods they
expected.
growth.

Only certain groups in society gained from Iran's economic
It was mainly those in heavy industry who prospered.

The

many who did not had to put up with serious over crowding as Tehran's
population rose from 2.5million in 1970 to 5 million in 1977, with
rents soaring as high as 70% of income and high inflation rates.
While the people's living standards were not rising, their expectations
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were:

the new marble-fronted appartment buildings: the 900,000

cars in the city with no public transport system; and the expensive
western goods in the shops, enable people in northern Tehran to
see how the rich were prospering from Iran's oil wealth.(15)

The

shah's claims that that within 10 years Iran would be one of the
five wealthiest nations in the world, and his limited socio-economic
reforms of April 1975 gave the working class hope their expectations
could be fulfilled.(16)

In 1975 Iran's exports fell by 10%.Even though oil sales abroad
were to recover in 1976-77,

this did nothing to boost the confidence

of the Iranian business community.

As Eric Rouleau said, "This

had not dissipated the disenchantment noticable in Iran’s business
community, a disenchantment matching the expectations born of the
1974 boom".(17)

For Iran to develop economically, it had to use

its oil revenues to promote economic diversification.
was happening;

The reverse

Iran's non-oil exports declined from 22% of imports

in 1959 to 5% of imports in 1978.

I would now like to look at the difficulties faced by the Iranian
State.

Even with its huge oil wealth, to begin with, American reports

put the waste factor in Iranian industry as high as 40% for a number
of reasons:

the emphas s on artisanal labour with lack of large

firms; the inefficiency in even large Iranian corporations; the
relatively high cost of labour; and the high tariffs that diminished
the need to compete.(18)

Another economic problem in Iran was the

degree of military spending.

Under the 1973-1975 5-year plan, Iran

spent an estimated 31% of its revenue on defense.(19)

Iran's

infrastructure was sadly lacking; there were simply not the resources
to transport imported goods.

The long lines at the Iranian-Soviet

border and the rotting cargoes at the port of Khorramshar were public
signs of this problem.

Not only did the military absorb 31% of

the government budget,

but it also worked against private enterprise

in the taking of other valuable resources such as skilled manpower.
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The high level of government spending, financed by oil revenues,
increased domestic demand and sent prices rising.

The shah's attempt to use Iran's oil wealth to "modernize" his nation
was unsuccessful.

He failed to increase agricultural production,

with the result that 1977 Iran was net importer of $2,500 million
in food (10% of its income)(20)
stagnated.

In addition, non-oil production

Some of this wealth was skimmed off by the shah's family,

or went to compensate the middle classes for their lack of political
power.

As long as the shah had sufficient economic wealth to make

his promises credible, he stood a chance of keeping the bourgeoisie's
loyalty.

Few powerful political appointments went to the bourgeoisie,

so as soon as they felt economically threatened, they begun to with
draw their support.(21)

The reforms passed by the shah in April 1975

led many in the business community to conclude that the shah had
deserted them.

Rouleau quoted one prominent businessman as saying

"the shah's revolution is no longer a white revolution, it is a
pink one".(22)

The Iranian political system was highly centralized.

Until 1975

the Majlis, or lower house, consisted of two parties, the Iran Novin
and the Mardom.

The Iran Novin Party served as the loyal opposition.

In 1975 these two parties merged into one - the National Resurgence
Party.

The shah banned all other political parties and encouraged

all Iranians to join the new organization.

Political activity was to be channeled through either the right
or left-wing of this one party.

Those who wanted to remain politically

active either had to join the Party or "face the consequences".

From 1963-1977, the shah successfully managed this system through
economic incentives and repression.

His main instrument in this

repression was his State security organization, SAVAK.

However,

there was no way the shah could stop the rising economic social
and political expectations of certain groups.

He could control
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them for a while, but he could not prevent them.
oil revenues reached a plateau.(24)

In 1977 Iran's

The shah refused to reduce

his military spending, which limited his room for maneuver.

In

response to foreign pressure, especially President Carter's human
rights policy, the shah was forced to relax his political stanglehold.
It was at this time that political tension burst into the open.

The political opposition was divided into two sections - secular
and clerical.

The secular oppostion consisted of two main parties

- the Liberation movement of Iran and the National Front.

The

National Front, revived in 1977, was the successor to the National
Front of Mossadeq's time.

This Tehran-based party advocated major

political reforms, largely grounded in the 1906 constitution.

It's leaders organized and addressed many large rallies and, while
it had a good deal of sympathy with the clergy, it was purely secular.
There was to be much friction between the National Front and the
clergy after the revolution.

The other secular party, the Liberation

Movement of Iran, favoured more intimate links with the clergy.
This party made good use of the Mosque network, and its leader,
Mehdi Bazergan, became Khomeini's first prime minister.
was one which fused nationalism to Islam.

Their position

While Bazergan was to

resign as prime minister in response to the taking of the American
hostages in 1979, close links remained between this party and the
clergy.

Politically, the clergy was important for three reasons: their alliance
with the Bazeris brought huge crowds to the streets in 1978; they
gave the revolutionary movement its ideology; and, most important
of all, they provided the opposition with an alternative communications
network.

Speeches and messages were transfered from one town to

another without using established media channels.

An in-depth study of human rights violations in Iran is beyond the
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scope of this paper.

What needs to be considered is how this

repression had a bearing on the political system.
national stated:

Amnesty Inter

"The total number of political prisoners

has

been reported at times throughout the year (1975) to be anything
from 25,000 to 100,000".(25)

The treatment of these prisoners

has been well documented, and is not only an indictment of the shah's
regime, but also the whole western world whose economic interests
in Iran overshadowed any morale obligations.

What effect did SAVAK have on the Iranian people? Even though the
shah claimed that the SAVAK had only 4,000 members, its policies
were meant to make the people feel that they were always being watched.
(26)

This led to distrust.

A source cited by Marvin Rois expressed

this feeling:
The people.... are distrustful.
If you want the truth
the people have lost confidence in everybody and
everything.
This distrust begins with the people
themselves.
People are no longer sure of their
own ideas, beliefs, attitudes, or even their decisions.
This distrust in oneself, gained through actual experience,
extends naturally to other too.
They no longer trust
everyone.
They have heard so many lies, have seen so much
creeping and crawling... whom can they trust? The
people don't even trust the "people"(27)
The above passage is very important.
of anything political.

This distrust led to a distrust

When the shah's political control mechanism

began to fail, there was no way he could recapture support form
a disbelieving population, many of whom bore the scars of SAVAK
brutality.

The shah tried to modernize his nation, while maintaining complete
political control.

This was not possible.

By depriving all others

of any important part in the political decision-making process,
he alienated himself from the population.

He came to power through

the armed forces and, by failing to establish his governments legitmacy,
increasingly relied on wealth and repression to keep that power.
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What role did ideology play in the Iranian revolution?

Fred Haliday

would say it is wrong to think of what happened in Iran as an Islamic
revolution,(28) his rationale being that it took a united front
to overthrow the shah.

This is true.

It is also true that there

is a chance the shah might have averted the revolution if he could
have reached a compromise with the more moderate members of the middle
class and clergy.

In this way, he might have isolated the more

radical members of the clergy.

However, we must not underestimate

the role of Islam in this more limited context.

The shah and his father, Reza Khan, had undertaken a policy of weaken
ing the clergy's social and political standing.

The clergy's

influence over education and law, two fields in which they were
traditionally very strong, had been considerably diminished by
legislation passed in the 1950's and 1960's.

At the same time the

clergy lost their religious endowment lands, which embraced 2% of
all land before the shah's "White Revolution",
perpetrated attacks on the major

the shah also

theological colleges such as Gom,

in 1963 and 1975.

More than 80% of Iranians are Shia Muslims.
schools of thought.

There are different

These can basically be divided into fundamentalists,

led by Khomeini, and reformists, led by Shariati until his death.
The reformists Islamic theory appeals to students and intellectuals,
and is an attempt to bring Islam into line with modern world.

The Islamic teachings of Khomeini are much more traditional.

He

sees himself as a defender of the faith, and uses emotional language
and images to mobilize his followers.

He exploits messianic yearnings

and while never claiming to be returning Iman, he does nothing to
dispel such sentiments.

His opposition to the shah concentrated

on three points, primarily, the shah's autocratic rule. Khomeini
believes he himself alone can rule autocratically because he is
acting in the name of Allah.

The shah was acting against the will
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of God.

This was also a good point to unite the opposition factions,

as it appealed to the middle class.

Second, Khomeini opposed the

shah's close links to the United States.

Third, he did not like

the relaxation of morals which had occured during the shah's reign.

The 1960's and 1970's were decades of great social change in Iran.
When people are confronted by such change, they often fall back
on traditional values.

This is not mere speculation.

A brief look

at the tremendous upsurge in religious activity in this period will
confirm this.

In 1976 there were 48 publishers of religious books

in Tehran alone.
period.(29)

Twenty-five of these sprang up in the 1965-75

In 1976-77 3.5 million people visited the holy shrines

of Moshad, whilst ten years before they had only been 332,000.
There are four ways in which Shia Islam was of importance to the
revolution: To begin with, it furnished the opposition movement with
a set of values.

Next, it provided a moral banner behind which

the opposition could form.

Furthermore, it gave the movement an

organization which was based outside of the state of apparatus,
and beyond the direct control of the shah.

Finally, it gave the

movement a charismatic leader.

PRECIPITANTS

The first of my precipitants is that of leaderhsip.
of various groups formed the opposition.

An alliance

Each of these groups had

leaders, some more important than others, nevertheless it is important
to understand Ayatollah Khomeini was not the only leader.

The

religious leaders did play a critical role in the revolution.

It

was their emotional appeal, as well as their moral "strength" that
persuaded many to come into the streets in opposition to the shah.
The great moral fervor they employed, and their reluctance to negotiate
with secular authorities, could not have been stimulated by a purely
secular movement.
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Khomeini was not the automatic choice for a religious leader.

There

were other important ayatollahs, such as Shariatmadei and Taleqai,
who were religiously and socially very strong.

Two main reasons

explain why Khomeini came to the position he did.

First, his move

from Najaf in Iraq, where he had been since 1965, to Neuple-Chateau
near Paris, in October 1978 gave him better access to the media
than he had enjoyed in Iraq, enabling him to construct a well-crafted
campaign that put him at the forefront of the revolution.

Second,

Khomeini refused to negotiate with the shah or his ministers.

If,

at a suitable time, the shah had been able to negotiate with the
moderate opposition
defeated Khomeini.

leaders he could perhaps have isolated, and
The shah did not initiate good faith negotiations,

but rather responded to violence by making concessions.
became clear that
were drawn.

When it

no compromise could be reached, battle lines

It was only natural that Khomeini, who had never damaged

his reputation by talking to the shah would become leader of the
opposition faction.

The reaction of the regime to

popular unrest is critical to any

understanding of the revolution.
question into two sections.

I would like to separate

this

Briefly, I would like to discuss the

shah's reaction to opposition before 1977, then, in a little more
detail, consider his response to the unrest of 1977-78.

There was very little manifest unrest between 1963 and 1977.(30)
What little there was, such as activity by the Mojahidin, student
unrest, or industrial strikes, was brutally suppressed.

There was

no viable threat to the shah's authority, and he felt that there
could be no compromise.

He felt that he needed to exercise complete

control in order to fulfill his mission and westernize Iran.

In 1977, things changed.

It is important to note there was no cohesive

policy on how to deal with this change.

There are a couple of points

that are often neglected and are relevant to our discussion.

In

the first place, the shah had recently lost many of his old friends
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and key advisors.

Examples of those lost are court minister Asadollah

Alam and former prime minister Manuchehr Eqbal.
was also important.

The shah's health

First diagnosed in 1974, the lymphoratas cancer

and the treatments used to contain this condition must have reduced
the shah's ability to deal with the trying conditions of 1978.

The liberalization policy of the shah was a question of "too little,
too late".

This policy,

forced on him by worsening domestic conditions

and pressure from the United States, enabled the opposition to organise
effectively.

March 1978 saw a number of demonstrations in which

all opposition groups particpated.

The shah made more extensive concessions in response to strikes and
demands.

These included Islamic reforms, freedom of the press, and the

promise of free elections. These evoked no response, and on September,
8 the shah imposed martial law.

The opposition continued to test

the shah and, on that same day, the massacre at Jaleh Square seemed
to dissolve any hope for peaceful settlement.

These concessions

by the shah not only failed to appease the opposition, they also
shook the confidence of those who supported the monarch.

His supporters

began to wonder how strong the shah's commitment to them really
was.(31)

In November the shah put the country under martial law,

and the stage was set for the flight of the shah on January 17, 1979.
On February, 11 the revolution had begun.

We must view the events of 1978 in the context of the rest of the
shah's rule.

Cpntralizing control through a policy of cultivating

distrust led

to his not being able to consolidate support in 1978.

The question here is whether the tensions in Iran could be diffused,
or whether revolution was inevitable.

There are, I feel, two options

the shah had if he was to diffuse this discontent, at least in the
short term: to give up political power, or to use physical force
to crush the unrest at whatever cost.
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The shah did not want to relinquish his political power,
initiated discussions on power sharing.

He never

By the time he instituted

important reforms late in 1978 it was too late.

Even if the opposition

leader had believed his promises, they had no reason to compromise
because they now expected to take full power.

The only other alterna

tive open to the shah was to employ full military force to crush
to rebellion.

This was basically the tactic used in 1963.

The

reason the shah was unwilling to adopt this option was an uncertainty
at the Amercian response.

Another explanation was that his whole

country was solidly against him and his army was beginning to disintergrate under the pressure of competing loyalties.(32)

There is of

course no guarantee that either of these options would have been
successful.

Indeed, by January 1979 they had ceased to exist. His

erratic policy of limited liberalization and outright repression
did nothing to appease the opposition, it merely frightened those
who would have supported him.

Central to my thesis is the idea that no regime will fall unless
it is physically weaker than the opposition.
to this process.

There are two steps

First, the government, stripped of any power base

in society, relies increasingly on the military.

Second, this military

force becomes effectively weaker than those forces opposing it.

The shah centralized authority to such a degree that there was no
group in society with its own political power base.(33)

His policy

of "divide and rule" meant that there was nobody for him to turn
to for support.
in power.

He depended entirely on the military

to remain

The shah claimed his legitimacy came from 2,500 years

of imperial rule.

This was not a valid point.

The shah had no

intentions of devolving power to an elected parliament and made
no attempt to legitimize his rule.
of society.

He was isolated from the rest
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The shah spent the whole of his rule building up the armed forces.
His senior officers were fiercely loyal to him.
they not keep him in power?
collapse of the military.

Why then, could

There are three explanations for the
To begin with, the abdication of the

shah and the arrival of the American General Huyser caused confusion
among the officer corps.

They did not know whether Huyser had come

to support Baktiar's government, or whether he was in Iran to negotiate
a peaceful handing over of power to Khomeini.

Furthermore, the

army had no roots in society but was an isolated pillar of support
for the shah.

Also, despite it's massive arms procurement, the

Iranian army had never fought a serious war.

Finally, the senior

officers were not prepared to launch a full-scale counter offensive.
With the shah gone and the Americans negotiating with Khomeini,
the officers were in no position to take effective measures.
the army could have held Tehran.

Militarily

In the light of political circum

stances the military was not prepared to inflict heavy casualties
on the civilian population.(34)

The job of the shah was not an easy one.

In Chapter 2, I said revolutions

tend to happen during the country's modernizing stage.
this stage was particularly awkward.

In Iran

The shah wanted to convert

Iran from a traditional Islamic state into a modern western state
in a brief period.

What he failed to understand was that for a

country to be socially and economically developed, it also has to
be politically developed.

He needed to create political safety

valves so that the rising middle class would support, not oppose
him.

The shah failed.

Economically, he failed both to increase agricultural

and industrial output.
or health care.(35)

Socially, he failed to do much for illiteracy

Politically, he gave the middle classes no

room for expression, so they took hold of the opportunity to join
with the clerics in ousting the shah.

The shah tried to modernize

Iran without giving it the tools to do the jobs.

For him to be
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successful, it would have taken more talent or luck than the shah
possessed.

There are many differences between Cuba and Iran.

Yet my theory

indicates that, despite their differences, they can be grouped togther.
The preconditions of economic and political discontent and ideology
were present.

They were acted on by the precipitants of leadership,

inefficient reaction by the regime and an ultimate weakness of physical
repressive capabilties.

The result was revolution.
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NOTES TO CHAPTER 4

(1)

I am refering to the riots at Jaleh Square

(2)

The author is aware that the state of Iran
is a modern entity.
For the sake of an historical perspective I am equating
contemporary Iran with Persia.

(3)

1906 was the date of the Iranian Constitution.
This document
was often quoted by secular opposition movements.

(4)

The date the shah took power

(5)

This is to defuse the argument that there was norevolution
in Iran on the grounds that Khomeini's rule was autocratic
as the Shah's.

(6)

Amin Saikal, The Rise and Fall of the Shah, Princeton, 1980
p193-195

(7)

Some of the opposition groups did not, at first, require the
shah to leave

(8)

Fred Haliday, Iran: Dictatorhsip and Development, London 1979
p106

(9)

The so called "White Revolution" was a reform package, under
a constitutional monarch, meant to appeal to both conservative
(White) and radical (Revolution) elements. See Saikal, p79

(10)

Haliday, p106

(11)

The landowners often received the water share in addition
to their 20?o land share.

(12)

Those who prospered were often the animal owners.

(13)

For urbanization, and inflation rates, see Table 2 in the
Appendix following this chapter.
There are very few unemloyment
figures for Iran and those that there are tend to count seasonal
workers as being employed.

(14)

Haliday, p138

(15)

E. Rouleau, Iran: The Myth and Reality, the Guardian Weekly,
October, 24, 1976.
(This article was published in two parts,
the concluding half appearing in the same paper on October,
31, 1976)
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(16)

The April 1975 reforms included giving 4?o of the shares in 320
firms to the workers, and 99?o in state run firms. Rouleay,
October, 31, p12

(17)

Rouleau, October, 24, p12

(18)

Haliday, p159

(19)

Ibid, p70

(20)

Saikal, p184

(21)

Haliday, p305

(22)

Rouleau, October, 31, p12

(23)

Although there was no direct pressure on people
to join the
party, all government personnel had to join andanybody
who
did not was seen as being anti-shah.
SeeJohn Stempel,
Inside
the Iranian Revolution, 1981, p35 Saikal, 9189

(24)

Iran's oil revenue fell from 20,000m dollars
in 1978.
Haliday, p143

(25)

Reza Baraheni, The Crowned Canibals: Writing on Repression
in Iran, New York, 1977, p7

(26)

There is considerable debate as to the correct number of SAVAK
agents.
Both Reza Baraheni and William Butler, chairman of
the Internation Commission of Jurists Executive Commission,
put the figure around 200,000.
Saikal, p190

(27)

Saikal, p19Q

(28)

Haliday, p134

(29)

Said Amir Arjomand, Shi'ite Islam and the Revolution, Government
and Opposition, vol 16, no 3 (Summer 1981), p311

(30)

The army was not once used during this period to restore order,
Haliday, p51

(31)

Rouleau quotes two prominent ijdustrialists, Habib Elchanin
and Habib Sabet, as being disallusioned with the Shah.
His
anti-corruption drive, during which he jailed 8,000 businessman
did nothing to bolster confidence within the business community.

(32)

A military coup in Iran was always an option, however, the
potential cost in human lives and the split in the officer
corps made it more and more remote as time went by.

in 1976 to 17,000m
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(33)

The Shah made all the important decisions, and political
power stemmed from him,
see Stempel, p18

(34)

Besides, a largely rural conscript army could not be relied
upon to continually open fire upon their countrymen.

(33)

Haliday, p286

CHAPTER V

OVERTHROW OF SOMOZA

It is difficult to decide on relevant causes for the Nicaraguan
revolution.

The presence of U.S. troops in the country from 1909

to 1933, the assasination of General Augusto Cesar Sandino in 1934,
and the rise to the presidency of Anastiasio Somoza Garcia in 1936
are all relevant to the Nicaraguan revolution of 1979.

This chapter

will indicate the importance of these events while concentrating
on events that occured in the 1970's, such as the Managuan earthquake
and the assasination of Pedro Joaquin Chamorro.

These events are

extremely important and must be seen as directly relevant to the
Nicaraguan revolution rather than symptoms of the revolutionary
process.

The first problem we have to deal with is whether there was a
revolutionary movement in Nicaragua.

There was no single, rigidly

organized, revolutionary group, enjoying mass support which sought
to overthrow Somoza.(1)
not.

Does this refute my theory?

I believe

As with the revolutions in Cuba and Iran, there were many

groups which sought to overthrow Somoza.

There were also many people

in Nicaragua who, without belonging to any formal organization,
were looking for an opportunity to voice their discontent with the
Somoza regime.

As Richard Fagen points out;

Fed up with more than four decades of tyrannical and brutal
rule, the citizenry had revolted.
Inspired, but not necessarily
directly led by the Sandinistas, thousands of young men
and women had taken up whatever arms were at hand.
Hundreds
of thousands of other nicaraguans helped in what way they could:
by closing their shops and by sheltering and supplying the
multitude of muchachos heroicos or simply by passing information
or aiding in the myraid of other tasks necessary to keep the
struggle going.(2)
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Examples of the hatred felt against Somoza were the 120,000 people
who paraded at the funeral of Chammorro and the almost pregnant
general strike of January 1978.(3)

There is no doubt there was a movement seeking to overthrow Somoza.
This on its own is not enough to label those people as revolutionary.
We need to look for evidence of radical policies.

The five-person

Government of National Reconstruction (JGRN), which succeeded Somoza,
could^ not be considered extremist.

A majority of this group, consisting

of two conservatives (Violetta Chammorro and Alfonso Robello), two
social democrats (Sergio Ramierex and Daniel Ortega), and one leftist
(Moises Hassan), favored moderate policies which committed the new
government to a pluralist society guaranteeing private property.
The reason for this stance is clear:

The Sandinistas realized that,

given the shattered state of the Nicaraguan economy, they had to
encourage private enterprise and foreign investment.

The best way

for them to do this was to present a moderate front.

While the

real strength lay with the Sandinista Nation Liberation Front (FSLN),
the bourgeoisie had been important in the earlier stages of the
revolution, and the Sandinistas wanted to weaken gradually the
bourgeois position yet keep and international image of internal
unity.

The real political power rested not with the JGRN, but with

the nine-man Sandinist National Directorate (DNC), whose member
were more extreme than those of the provisional government(4).

Though there had always been guerillas dedicated to overthrowing
Somoza, it was not until 1974-77 that this became a mass movement.
This movement became revolutionary, when it's leadership was transferred
to the F.S.L.N.

When this happened, the movement's political goals

crystalized and became more radical.(3)
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PRECONDITIONS

With an area of some 57,143 square miles, Nicaragua is a little
larger than the state of Wisconsin.(6)
people worked in agriculture.(7)

In 1970, 47% of it's 2 million

It's main crops are coffee and

cotton, although sugar is also important.

Nicaragua underwent

modernization accomplished throught light industrialization and
import substitution.

Between 1960 and 1970 manufacturing grew at

an annual rate of 10.5%; investment increased in both private and
public sectors (from 4.4% and 10.2% of GDP respectively in 1960
to 6.6% and 13.2% in 1970); and the Nicaraguan GDP rose at an annual
rate of 6.9%.(8)

Despite this industrialization, Nicaragua was still predominantly
a producer of primary products.

By the 1969's and 1970's the terms

of trade were distinctly unfavourable to coffee and cotton.

The

1974-75 recession hit Nicaragua, along with the other primary producers,
extremely hard.(9)

The increase in light industry led to an influx

of equipment resulting in the rise of capital imports from 18.5%
of total imports in 1960 to 21.2% in 1976.

The import of intermediary

products also resulted in worsening terms of trade, and the techniquues
led to an increase in rural unemployment, resulting in a migration
of peasants into alredy overcrowded towns.(10)

What were conditions like in the Nicaraguan countryside and what
effect did this have on the revolution?
owned 17.4% of the land.

(11)

In 1975, 78.2% of Nicaraguans

Those peasants who owned small plots

of land engaged in subsistence farming, growing corn, beans and
rice.

During the harvest months, November to February, they would

join with the landless labourers in working the coffee and cotton
harvests.

This resulted in many people being able to work for only

four months to support their families for the entire year.

The

illiteracy rate in pre-revolutionary Nicaragua was around 70%, with
the rates in the countryside hovering around 90%.

Only 16.1% of
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the houses had
facilities.

potable water and scarcely 8% boasted sewerage

The infant mortality rate was one of the highest in

Latin America, standing at some 102 deaths out of 1,000 live births.

(12 )
Conditions in rural areas were, by any standard extremely poor.
No doubt many peasants provided at least tacit support for the
Sandinastas.
area.

However, Somoza's problems did not stem from this

It was urban unrest which was to start the 18-month civil

war that brought down his government.(13)

There are two forms of discontent in the towns: bourgeois and
proletarian. Somoza treated the urban working class paternalistically,
granting workers a social security system and an annual bonus of
one months pay.

This was not enough to compensate for high unemployment

rates and poor working conditions.

Members of the working class

were extremely conscious of the wealth enjoyed by Somoza and his
entourage.

Much of this came from the relief funds meant to benefit

the disaster victims.

The scraps that Somoza threw to the working

class did nothing to soften the blow of rising inflation (the annual
inflation rate rose from 1.7% before 1970 to 11% in 1977), and brutal
National Guard repression.(14)

The bourgeoisie had allied itself closely with the Somoza dynasty.
In return for being politically quiet, they had been given a stable
environment in which to accumulate considerable wealth.
1972 Managua earthquake, things changed.

After the

Somoza appropriated relief

funds for himself, alienating members of the middle

class and scaring

away foreign investment.(15)

By 1978 there were grave economic problems.
aggravated by 18 months of civil war.

These were further

It is estimated that 50,000

people were killed and a further 100,000 wounded.
to infrasturcture was around $480million.
flight of approximately $1.5 billion.

Direct damage

There was

also capital

Hundreds of millions of dollars
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worth of crops were either not planted or destroyed.

The damage was

so bad that by the end of 1981, real per capita income was 25% less
than it was before the war started.(16)

For the initial political unrest in Nicaragua, we must look to the
bourgeoisie.

Whatever the

position of the FSLN in the coalition

that finally overthrew Somoza, we must agree with Alfonso Robello
when he argues that it was the middle class who started the revolution
going:

"We were the center of the opposition to Somoza:

Without

us the Sandinistas would not have had their victories".(17)

Before 1972, the middles class was reasonable happy with the political
power structure in Nicaragua.(18)

As well as receiving economic

privilages, they enjoyed a political role, albeit limited, through
the opposition Conservative party.

The last agreement between the

Conservative party and the ruling National Liberal party allowed
for

a handing over of presidential power to a triumverate between

1972-74.

The middle class was willing to go along with Somoza for as long
as it was in their interests to do so.

The bourgeoisie saw its

interest threatened, with Somoza's reneging on the 1972 agreement,
his handling of the earthquake relief operations, and his encroachment
into fields of operation traditionally enjoyed by the middle class.
The moderate opposition grouped around the anti-Somoza editor of
"La Prensa", Pedro Joaguin Chamorro.

In 1974 Chamorro organized

seven political parties, and two labor confederations into the
Domestic Liberation Union (UDEL).

These politicians could hardly have been called revolutionary.
They tried to put pressure on the United States to persuade Somoza
to give up most of his political power.

This did not occur and

proved one of the main reasons for the failure to reach a moderate
settlement.
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The Broad Opposition Front (FAO), a centrist oroanization, was founded
in May 1978 after the assassination of Chamorro.
chance to

This was the last

keep the movement to oust Somoza in moderate hands.

The

bourgeois opposition lost the iniative during the crucial months
of May-August 1978.

They spent their time waiting for U.S. pressure

to force Somoza from office, while the radical FSLN spent this time
grabbing popular imangination with such actions a s the capture
of the National Palace on August, 22, 1978.(19)

The United States

did not react to the pressure put on it by the Nicaraguan bourgeoisie
and angered many moderates by sending a telegram to Somoza congratula
ting him on his improved human rights records.

With the tecerista

faction of the FSLN willing to negotiate with the moderate factions,
there was

really no other path for the movement

What role

did ideology play in this revolution?

to take.(20)

Although the FSLN

was to play an important part in leading the movement, the revolution
was, to some degree, a spontanious uprising against Somoza, sparked
by such incidents as the assassination of Chamorro.

Bearing this

in mind, there would seem to be very little part for ideology to
play.

It did not play the same role as Islam did in the Iranian

revolution, but it was important.

If we look at the leaders of

the revolution, we can identify an ideology among them,

and we

can see what effect it had on their actions.

This ideology was a mixture of Marxism and Sandinism.
is Sandinism?

What then

Taking its name from the guerilla leader Cesar Augusto

Sandino, it is a mixture of Socialism and Nationalism.

To quote

Henry Weber:

With Sandino's guerilla activity, a new political force,
hostile to both factions of the Nicaraguan oligarchy made
its appearance on the historical arena in a form of
petty-bourgeois nationalism, tinged with utopian socialist
and spriritualist ideology.(21)
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Sandinism is as Carlos Fonseca Amador pointed out "a dinstinctly
Nicaraguan experience, Socialist and National demands are combined
in the Sandinist People's Revolution.

We identify with Socialism

whilst retaining a critical attitude to the socialist experience".(22)

I doubt whether ideology had the direct effect on Nicaraguans that
it had on the Iranian people.
leadership.

It did have an effect on the FSLN

It is interesting to see, how events in contemporary

Nicaragua show this influence.

PRECIPITANTS

The FSLN did not instigate the huge demonstrations and the 90% general
strike that shook the Somoza regime.(23)

It was the moderate political

opposition that started the protest and the FSLN merely endorsed
it midway through.

Within one year the FSLN seized control of the

revolutionary movement that overthrew Somoza.

The role of the FSLN

is crucial to any study of the Nicaraguan revolution.

The FSLN was founded in 1962.

It sprang up with many other guerilla

groups following the success of Fidel Castro in Cuba.

It was to

hit the international headlines in 1974, when it conducted a raid
on a society Christmas party in Managua, taking hostage 12 members
of Somoza's inner circle.

The FSLN was again quiet, following the

National Guard's counter-insurgency program until 1977.

As William

Leo Grande points out, the FSLN was not a threat to the Somoza regime
at the beginning of 1978.(24)

The FSLN used the assassination of

Chamorro to seize the leadership of the opposition movement.
was able to do this for three important reasons:

It

First it caught

the popular imagination with such actvities as the August raid on
the National Palace.

Second, it offered a radical alternative to

the poor and did not compromise its position by giving ground to
the United States.

Third, and most important, it gave hope that

Somoza could be overthrown.

If Somoza were to go, the population
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knew he would have to be defeated militarily.

The FSLN provided

hope that this could be done, causing many to believe in the struggle
against Somoza.(25)

Somoza himself played an important part in bringing about the revolu
tion.

He did this in four main ways:

To begin with, his instigating

of the brutal National Guard repressions of 1974-77 and September 1978
sowed seeds of revolution in an already disillusioned population.
Next, his relative relaxation of repression in 1977, following moves
by President Carter, enabled the FSLN to resume military operations.
Furthermore, his cover up of the murder of Chamorro did not reduce
suspicions that he had been behind the assassination. Finally, his
failure to take seriously negotiations which might have meant his
stepping down from the presidency prevented any real chance of arriving
at a peaceful settlement.

Between 1974 and 1977, the National Guard launched a counter-insurgency
campaign.

This campaign was aimed at the northern departments of

Zelay, Matagalpa, and Segouva, where the FSLN had been the most
active.(26)

Sections of the population were uprooted and sent to

resettlement camps.

Somoza believed that his efforts had been

successful, but they were not.

Within his own country, it brought

cries of indignation from such conservative groups as the Roman
Catholic bishops, who were outraged at the "humiliating and inhuman
treatment ranging from torture and rape to summary execution",
perpetrated by the National Guard on fellow Nicaraguans.(27)
Internationally, there was such an outcry that even the United States
had to reduce military aid.

The counter Insurgery campaign's main

effect was on the Nicaraguan people themselves.
it safer

This terror made

for many people to join the FSLN, than it was to stay

in their own homes.(28)

It also conditioned people to violence,

and made them more dedicated to seeing the removal of Somoza.

As

one old man in Managua put it, "We've had weeks of bullets. Bullets
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for breakfast, bullets for lunch, bullets for dinner, and bullets
before going to bed.

But after they bomb you, bullets mean nothing".

(29)

Somoza did not follow Batista's lead and flee the country before
his regime was really threatened, but stayed to put up a struggle.
Vet, if a revolution is to succeed, there must be a time when the
revolution forces are stronger than the conservative ones.
usually takes place in two stages:

This

the isolation of the regime

from any power base in society; and the weakening of the armed forces
which are then keeping the regime in power.

Cuzan and Heggen made the point that the strength of any government
depends on three things: its legitimacy, the scope of its operations,
and its coercive strength.(30)
degree of political support,
earthquake.

Before 1972, Somoza enjoyed a fair
this was to change following the Managua

At the same time, he was intent on increasing the scope

of his government operations by 28%.
reduced his coercive capabilities.

Interestingly enough, he also
(Between 1965-75 the number

of National Guard soldiers per 1,000 of population fell by 40%).
The fighting capability of those remaining was open to question.
Somoza so feard a coup he rotated his officers incommand and
encouraged widespread corruption so that guardsmen would owe their
allegiance only to him.

In concluding this section, I must agree

with Cuzan and Heggan when they said

...had Somoza given away proportions of his wealth and
power and adopted democratic proceudres, he could
have acquired enough legitimacy to persuade the
population to recognize the authority of his
government and reject the appeals of the Marxist
revolutionaries.(31)

The revolution in Nicaragua could have been avoided as late as 1978.
The best chance of such a move seemed to be through U.S. pressure
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on Somoza to reach an agreement with the more moderate elements of
the opposition.

Nevertheless, it seemed that the United States

was always one step behind what was really going on.

As Richard

Fagen points out, "History has also reaffirmed the seemingly infinite
capacity for the U.S. government to misread and mismanage the
situation".(32)

When America first started negotiations with the

oppositional bourgeoisie through the FAO in 1978, it wanted to keep
Somoza in power.

This was not possible and all these negotiations

did was damage the credibility of the FAO.
realized that Somoza had to resign.

the United States then

Having seemingly made a crucial

step forward, they then wanted to keep the FSLN out of any Nicaraguan
government at a time when the Sandinastas were leading the revoltuionary
movement.

When the FSLN was on the brink of military victory, the

United States tried to put pressure on them to add two more moderates
to the provisional government.

There was no longer any room to

negotiate.

Not all the blame for the handling of the Nicaraguan situation must
be put on President Carter.
stubborness.

Carter first had to deal with Somoza's

When given the choice between a dictator and a

communist, the President did not have a lot of room for manouvers.
Yet even if Carter had seen the need to force Somoza to go, he still
would have faced a strong pro-Somoza lobby on Capitol Hill.

After

the National Guards mopping up campaign of September 1978, U.S.
Reps Charles Wilson (D-Texas), and John Murphy (D-NY) were threatening
to hold up legislation if Carter moved against Somoza.(33)

The preconditions for revolution existed in Nicaragua.

What is

very interesting to note in this respect is the way in which certain
events acted as catalyst on this discontent, and how the FSLN was
able to use the resultant unrest to take control of the opposition
movement.

My theory allows for the fact that not every factor will

hold the same weight in every revolution.
Whilst I feel that the

Ideology is a good example.

study of ideology is important for a full
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understanding of the Nicaraguan revolution, I don't think it was
as important as it was in Iran.

I believe that no historical event is inevitable.
can do is say that given a certain set

All that one

of factors, one of the possible

outcomes of those factors could be a certain event.
extremely well with the Nicaraguan revolution.

This works
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Beginning with the January 13 general strike called by COSEP

(13)
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(14)
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of the 1972 earthquake relief operations, angering all other
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(18)
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(19)
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(25)
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CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSION

First I would like to look at some of the discussion points raised
by my examination of existing theoretical work.

Second, how successful

has my theory been in answering the questions raised by the the
three case studies, and what throwbacks has this had on to the initial
discussion?

Third, I hope to provide some pointers for the direction

of future research.

Revolution is a topic worthy of attracting research because of its
widespread political, economic and social consequences.

Modern

research into revolution has provided very few conclusions.

I believe

the time has now come for us to use contemporary revolutions to
test existing theories, rather than developing new theories to explain
classical revolutions.(1)

This contemporary work will enable us

to fine tune our theories, or revert to discovering new ones, and
will stop us from trying to force the factual foot into the theoretical
shoe.

The modern student of politics knows too little about the causes
of revolution to judge whether they can be studied in the same context
as other forms of collective violence.

It may be that an industrial

stike can be analyzed in much the same way as revolution, but until
we know more about the causes of revolutions it makes more sense
to focus on the complex series of events which make up a revolution.
This definition need not hold the political scientist up definitely
as all that is required is a working definition which will help
us to focus on the matter at hand.

If pre-1959 Cuban society had been flawless it would have been easy
to identify the causes of the Cuban Revolution.

However, there

has never been, nor will there be, a perfect society.

The social
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scientist must decide when levels of discontent within a country
both absolute and perceived, are unacceptably high.

He then needs

to consider the government's response to this unrest and whether
it is likely to result in revolution.

It is easy to highlight discon

tent with hindsight but not as easy to predict.

It is the social

scientist's duty to develop a theory capable of predicting revolution.

My definition states that there must be a mass movement seeking to
bring radical economic, political and social change through violent
means.

In the Iranian, Nicaraguan and Cuban revolutions this movement

was held together by a desire to see the end of the existing regime.
The revolutionary leadership tended to be more radical than the mass
membership.

This conflict of interest caused tension after the

revolution had succeeded, at which point it became extremely difficult
to reconcile differences within the movement.

Present day Iran and

Nicaragua are good example of this tension.

There was then, in all three case studies, a mass movement seeking
change by violent means.

However, it was the revolutionary leadership

that provided the ideology to focus the need for radical change.

Economic discontent was prevalent in pre-revolutionary Cuba, Iran
and Nicaragua.

The problem here is that nearly all countries suffer

from discontent, in some shape or form, yet not all these experience
revolution.

We need to ask whether or not there were abnormally high

levels of discontent in these societies, who suffered it, and what
consequent effect did this

deprivation have on the revolution.

It

is not enough to say that just because there was deprivation, the
deprivation caused the revolution.

We must be able to show the effect

of deprivation on those people who perpetrated the revolution, if
we are going to label economic deprivation as a revolutionary cause.
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By Latin American standards Cuba was prosperous nation.(2) However,
there were two types of economic discontent in the country: "absolute",
in the Sierra Maestra Mountains, and "perceived" in the major cities.
(3)

One of the poorest parts of Cuba was the mountaineous region of the
Sierra Maestra.

It was in these mountains that Castro was able

to hide from Batista's Army and to finally establish his "Foco".(4)
While it is probably true that Guevarra and Castro have subsequently
overemphasized the role of the peasant in the Cuban revolution,
there can be little doubt that this role was a crucial one.j(5)

Many theorists have argued the importance of perceived deprivation.
It can be pointed to, but is extremely difficult to prove as we
are dealing with people's feelings.

What is interesting in the

three case studies is that it was not the people who suffered absolute
deprivation who sparked off the revolution.

This is because it

is not those who are starving who revolt, but those who, though
agrieved, have hope for something better.

Even Cuba, where the

revolution was nurtured in the Sierra Maestra, it was caused by
young intellectuals and not starving peasants.

It was among the revolutionary leadership that political discontent
was acutely felt.

They had political expectations which were not

met due to intransigence, either real or perceived, on the part
of the existing regime.

The revolutionary leadership attempts to

use the economic discontent as fuel to challenge the existing regime
through mass violence.

While the degree of political discontent

differs; the concept holds true for all three case studies.

In

Cuba, Castro and his followers were enraged by the manner in which
Batista seized power.

They held this seizure to be illegitimate,

and this resentment was the driving force behind the Cuban revolution.
In Iran there was discontent focused on the way the Shah was trying
to monopolize the political process.

In Nicaragua the middle class
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was unhappy about Somoza's refusal to share his power, a scenario
which came to a head with his reneging on the 1974 agreement.

It

was this middle-class discontent which was to spark off the revolution.

In Havana, the split between the rich and poor was particularly
apparent.

The wealth of the Americans and the Cuban upper classes

/re especially resented by the graduates churned out of Havana
University.

When combined with the political resentment felt by both students
and political emigrees at Batista's illegal seizure of power, this
perceived deprivation, goes a long way towards explaining the urban
revolutionary faction that played a vital part in the Cuban revolutionary
struggle.

The rapidly expanding city of Tehran was undoubtably the center
of the Iranian revolution.(6)

Perceived economic discontent

was

prevalent in a city which boasted 900,000 private cars but did not
enjoy a public transport system.

One half of the city shopped in

modern western stores while the other half scraped by on the bare
necessities.(7)

The filtering through of the massive Iranian oil

wealth went even further to fuel this discontent.

The percieved economic discontent in Iran was certainly felt by
those who fought the revolution.

In Nicaragua there was both absolute and perceived deprivation.
Predominantly a primary producer, Nicaragua suffered badly during
the world recession of 1974-75.

Urban Nicaragua also suffered from

high unemployment and soaring inflation.(8)

The final economic

straw was to devestate the nations's infrasturcture.
people suffered, Somoza's riches multiplied.

While his

His mismanagement

of the Managua earthquake relief funds further incensed both the
middle and working classes in Nicaragua.
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Ideology played a part in all three case studies.

However, the

importance of ideology as a revolutionary precondition varies greatly.
In Cuba and Nicaragua the aim of the revolutionary movement was
to over throw the existing regime and not to worry over what was
to

be put in it's place.

The revolutionary leadership formulated

an ideology which grew in significance as the revolution progressed,
but only really became apparent to the mass membership after the
revolution had been successful.

In Iran, the ideology was one of

the key revolutionary preconditions and was used to great effect
by the revolutionary leadership.

By trying to modernize Iran single-

handed, the shah took influence away from the traditional power
source; the clergy.

In times of radical change people cling to

traditional values.

An upsurge in religious activity in the 1970's

gave the self-styled defender of the faith, Khomeini, a base from
which to launch his attack on the shah.

The role of leadership as a catalyst in provoking revolution is
an interesting one.

In all three case studies there was no automatic

choice for revolutionary leader.

In Iran, Cuba and Nicaragua there

was a great deal of competition for the post.

In each case the

successful leaders acted to make themselves the only viable alternative
to the existing regime.

They also refused to be a party to any

negotiations with the leaders they sought to overthrow, so when
these talks failed, they were not discredited.

Khomeini's position

at the center of his international communications network, Castro's
work and broadcasts and subsequent capture of the Santa Clara gun
train and the Tercerista faction of FSLN's raid on the National
Assembly, caught the people's attention and set these leaders up
as viable alternatives to the existing regimes.

The next of my precipitants is that of the existing regimes reaction
to the initial discontent.

The preconditions for revolution can

lie dormant in society for many years.

(A discontent in the mountains

of the Sierra Maestra, and the modernization of Iran were not overnight
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phenomena).

The government's handling of initial problems is crucial

to future events.

Despite the record unemployment rates of the

1930's the contemporary government were seen to be trying to alleviate
the discontent.

Perhaps even more important, the legitimate power

structure was kept in place which allowed people to manifest their
discontent through the ballot box.

In Iran, Nicaragua and Cuba, instead of helping its people, each
government seemed to be repressing them through the use of indiscrim
inate terror.

This terror serves to make men join the revolutionary

movement because they are just as likely to suffer reprisals whether
or not they do so.

Good examples of this terror can be seen in

the work of SAVAK in Iran and the National Guard in Nicaragua.
With the National Guard's counterinsurgency campaign, it is said
to have been safer to join the FSLN than to stay in the villages.
Tied in with this repression is the unavailability of the political
process to those seeking redress.
those not actively

This combination leads to all

aligned with the regime placing

their allegiance

elsewhere.

The question of how a government deals with economic discontent
is not straightforward.

There are times, such as Nicaragua, where

the government is able to help those who are suffering but chooses
not to.

In other cases the government may be well aware of the

problems but be unable to do much about them.
here would be the present day Angola and Sudan.

Two good examples
In still other

cases the government may perceive the problem and be trying to do
something about it but their attempts are misguided and not appreciated
by the suffering people.

The shah of Iran was trying to bring his

country into the twentieth century but all his people saw was an
attempt to erode their traditional power structure.

My final precipitant is the effective military strength of the existing
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regime.

I agree with Gottschalk when he said this strength is the

key to whether or not a revolution will be successful.
two stages to the disintigration of any regime:

There are

The withering away

of any power base within society; and the inability to hold on to
power through merely military means.

The rest of this thesis has

been devoted to describing the alienation program which the regime
follows, this precipitant deals with how long they can hold on to
power when they have become isolated from the society in which they
govern.

When talking about military weakness it is easy to be tautological.
If we propose revolutions take place because of military weakness
it is not enough to quote as our evidence examples of revolution
which have taken place because the military was not strong enough
to prevent them.

To present a theory capable of predicting revolution

we must be able to foresee military collapse.

All three of our

case studies show this to be extremely diffficult.

In pre-revolutionary

Cuba, Castro's army of 800 men was up against Batista's well equipped,
modern fighting force. In both Iran and Nicaragua the revolutionary
forces were faced by western-trained and equipped military machines.
While it is easy to predict with hindsight, there were pointers
to the regime's military weakness which were available before the
revolution was successful.

All three of the armies were isolated

from their societies, because it was a common policy for soldiers
to serve away from homelands.

None of the armies had a great deal

of experience under battle conditions,

the weapons supplied by

the United States were highly technical and required a certain
expertise not available in these armies.

These weapons were also

often not applicable to the type of fighting that needed to be done.
Senior officers were appointed out of political loyalty and not
because of militiary expertise.

Not only did this lead to the wrong

man getting the job but it also alienated the capable young officers
whose services were badly needed.

Batista, Somoza and the shah

all rotated general's command's so that they could not establish
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an independent power base within the military.

It is also difficult

for even the best trained military men with the highest morale to
fire upon crowds of their own countrymen.

If the military is weak there are two factors which will determine
how long the regime will stay in power.

First, there needs to be

a strong revolutionary movement trying to overthrow it.

However,

even if there is such a movement the regime can be kept in power
through foreign intervention.
stop-gap measure.

Such interventions can only be a

In present day Afghanistan the Kabul goverment

is unlikely to fall so long as it is supported by the military might
of the Soviet Union.

On the other hand, should the USSR withdraw

its support, the Afghan government would face a fresh challenge
from the rebel forces.

Through testing this theory it soon becomes clear that while all
the factors within my theory do exist in each of the case studies,
their importance varies from revolution to revolution.

Ideology

was particularly important in Iran, yet in Cuba that part was played
by political discontent.

I believe with this weighting in mind

my theory is extremely useful when adopted as a causal framework
for

the study of contemporary revolutions.

Finally, I would like to consider some directions for future research.
Despite the high cost of revolution, both in financial and human
terms, these three case studies would seem to point to the inability
of the western world both to predict and prevent revolution.(9)
It is the responsibility of the social scientist to prove the tools
for predicting revolution.

This will not be done by twisting the

"classical revolutions", providing another revolutionary theory
to be refuted by still other social scientists.

What must be done

is to decide on a theoretical approach, be it psychological or casual
or both, and to actively test it against contemporary revolutions.
We also need to consider those revolutions which have failed so
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that we can identify those factors which prevent them from being
successful revolutions.

Finally, we need to use the same criteria

to study troubled nations over a number of years so we can identify
trends which could lead to a revolution.

This will not enable us

to state that a

revolution will take place but will tell us that

a revolutionary

situation is possible.

We are much more likely

to uncover this information using the same critieria over a number
of years than by undertaking spasmodic subjective studies using
the theory deemed to be the most popular at the time.

It is very easy for the social scientist to concentrate on revolutions
which are well past.

There is plenty of data on them and they are

now safely non-controversial.

However, we live in a contemporary,

controversial society and we all fail that
use the lessons

society if we do not

learned through history to try and predict,

prevent revolution.

and
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ENDNOTES

-

CONCLUSION

(1)

By "classical" revolution I am refering to those in the French
and Russian genre whilst "contemporary" revolutions I see
as being those post 1950

(2)

See table 3

(3)

The difference in living standards between rural and urban
Cuba was marked.

(4)

The "Foco" is the base for guerilla activity.
is given to it by both Mao& Giap

(5)

After the Cuban revolution had been successful there was much
argument over which faction rural or urban had done most to
bring about the collapse of the Batista government.
Both
Castro & Guevarra supported the peasant fighters.

(6)

The population of Tehran rose from 2.5 million in 1970 to
5 million in 1977

(7)

See E. Rouleau
Iran: The myth and reality.
1976

Special attention

The Gaurdian Weekly, October 24,

(8)

See table 7

(9)

See R. Fagen, The End of the Affair
Foreign Policy No 36 (Summer 1980) p 178 for a discussion
on America's seemingly inability to predict revolution

TABLE 1
THE CUBAN ECONOMY

YEAR

POPULATION

1950

1950-1957

GNP
(million dollars)

PRICES
(Price Index Using
1953 as base)

1692

1951

5.639

1946

1952

5.775

2007

1953

5.879

1794

100

1954

6.000

1808

97

1955
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1859

96

1956
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2015
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1957
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TABLE 3
RANKING ACCORDING TO PER CAPITA
INCOME AND AVERAGES OF PHYSICAL INDEXES

1933 Per Capita
Income

1939 Per Capita
Income

2

Argentina

1

3

Uruguay

10

7

Chile

2

4

Cuba

3

15

Costa Rica

8

Mexico

9

9

Brazil

16

16

Peru

7

1

Venezuela

4

6

Colombia

5

3

Panama

8

10

Dominican Republic

6

11

This Table is taken from Teichart, p185

Cuban Resources
Pedro C.M. Teichart, Analysis of Real Growth and Wealth in Latin
American Republics.
Journal of Inter-American Studies, vol1 no2 (April 1959), p173-202.
United Nations, Economic Survey of Latin America 1960, New York, 1961.
Unesco, Basic Facts and Figures, Paris 1961.
University of California, Centre of Latin American Studies.
Statistical Abstract of Latin American 1960, Los Angeles, 1960.
Boris Goldenberg, The Cuban Revolution and Latin America, London,
1965.
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TABLE 6
A COMPARISON BETWEEN DEFENCE SPENDING & OIL INCOME FROM 1970-1978

Defence Budget $ million

Oil Income $ million

880

1 093

1971

1 065

1 870

1972

1 375

2 308

1973

1 525

5 600

1974

3 680

18 523

1975

6 325

18 871

1976

8 925

20

1977

9 400

1978

—

CO
CO

1970

-

17 000

IRANIAN SOURCES
United Nations, Statistical Yearbook for Asia and Africa, 1979/80
United Nations, Statistical Yearbook, 1978
the Economist, The World in Figures, New York 1978
US Military Sales to Iran, Staff Report to the Subcommittee on
Foreign Assistance of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
Washington, 1976, p13.
Cited in Fred Haliday, Iran: Dictatorship
and Development, Middlesex, 1979, p94.
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